



Public health involves the application of a wide variety of scientific and non-scientific disciplines to
the very practical problems of improving population health and preventing disease. Public health has
received surprisingly little attention from philosophers of science. In this chapter we consider some
neglected but important philosophical aspects of the science of public health.
To appear in F. Gifford (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 16: Philosophy of Medicine.
Elsevier.
1
WHITHER THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUBLIC HEALTH?
Public health concerns the health of populations of people, rather than individual
people, as is the case in clinical medicine (where these individuals are dealt with
as ‘patients’) or in biomedicine more generally (where they are treated as ‘sub-
jects’).1 It deals with aggregates of measurements of properties of individuals and
is therefore a statistical science, facing the many (technical, epistemological, and
metaphysical) problems that this inevitably involves. It prizes the prevention (of
disease, disability, and premature death) over cure, and is therefore rather more dif-
ficult to assess than clinical medicine or biomedical science in terms of its success
or failure, since one has ‘counterfactual’ successes: e,g, ‘if this policy (or inter-
vention) hadn’t been in place Jones would have perished’.2 It is a massively in-
terdisciplinary field (perhaps the most interdisciplinary subject there is—cf. [Afifi
and Breslow, 1994], pp. 225–6), incorporating epidemiology, statistics, biology,
informatics, sociology, economics, psychology, environmental science, civic plan-
ning, architecture, engineering, and more, making public health a rather unwieldy
and complex discipline—indeed, there isn’t much that public health doesn’t (or
couldn’t) utilize in some way to achieve its aims. What is considered part of the
domain of applicability of public health is flexible to the point of near universal
inclusivity: almost anything can be viewed as a public health issue. Furthermore,
what is included in public health (and therefore the understanding of what pub-
lic health is) has changed over time, adapting to the changing conditions in society
1The population can be defined in any number of ways, and need not refer to geographical bound-
aries. For example, the population might be the ‘scattered object’ that consists of all smokers under
the age of eighteen years. We might, then, take individual-based clinical medicine to constitute a de-
generate case of population-based public health (i.e. for cases where the number of individuals in the
population is 1).
2It is in this regard that C. -E. A. Winslow refers to the “silent victories of public health” ([Winslow,
1923], p. 65). Likewise, Bernard Turnock writes that “when public health efforts are successful,
nothing happens. Events that don’t occur don’t attract attention. ... Indeed, the vast majority of those
who will ultimately benefit from the efforts of past and present public health workers are yet to be
born” ([Turnock, 2006], p. 1). This is particularly so when (on the basis of risk-benefit assessments)
interventions are imposed to stop technologies that might have otherwise been developed.
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that often bring new diseases, and adapting to the time-varying concepts of disease
and its determinants. These features make public health an especially challenging
field for philosophers of science various with novel issues not to be found in the
study of biomedical science.3
Despite the many conceptually interesting features alluded to above, and despite
it’s age and importance, the field of public health has received virtually no atten-
tion from philosophers of science, especially those belonging to the ‘analytical’
school—one exception is Douglas Weed (a professional epidemiologist and ‘ama-
teur’ philosopher!): he too bemoans the absence of philosophical work on public
health qua scientific discipline [Weed, 1999; 2004]. Much of the work available
tends to follow a ‘Continental path’, which has a tendency to ignore the scien-
tific aspects of public health (in favour of considerations of power relations, a` la
Foucault, for example). The work that falls outside of the Continental tradition is
primarily located within the fields of Science Studies and Bioethics, which tend to
have different agendas to the philosophy of science.4
My interest is with highlighting issues that are of relevance and importance to
(analytic) philosophers of science. I make no apologies for this lopsided approach;
I think it is necessary to provide balance to the debate as a whole. Here, then, I
attempt to redress the balance by offering a simple field guide to some philosoph-
ical aspects of public health, covering in (in a fairly preliminary way) a variety
of topics that really ought to have been better studied (or just studied, period) by
philosophers of science. Because public health includes in its domain many other
fields from medicine it treads on the toes of a vast array of issues that are dealt
with by other contributors to this volume. For this reason, when overlap is an issue
I avoid the nitty gritty details and paint the broad picture, showing how it connects
3This is not to say that all of the issues are novel: for example, since we are dealing with the health
and disease of the public we still have to say what we mean by ‘health’ and ‘disease’, and many of the
same issues are thrown up in this context as are thrown up in biomedicine: there are broadly ‘norma-
tivist’ (or subjectivist) and broadly ‘naturalist’ (or objectivist) approaches. This issue has ramifications
for how we measure health and disease which, in turn, has ramifications on how resources are dis-
tributed in health case systems—hence, these are not idle issues of no practical consequence. There are
also issues to do with causal inference, evidence, the nature of theories, and so on, that are more or less
on a par with those from biomedicine. However, even these issues do take on a very different flavour
on account of the fact that the systems of interest are populations and the quantities of interest belong
to these populations.
4‘Public health ethics’ has recently emerged as a specialized sub-discipline of bioethics devoted to
“those ethical issues and perspectives that may be said to be distinctive to public health ... apart from
the perspective of clinical medicine” ([Bayer et al., 2006], p. 4)—see [Dawson and Verweij, 2007] for
a nice collection of essays on the subject (many of which are by philosophers). The ethical implications
flow fairly ineluctably and quite obviously: the systems of investigation in public health are often very
large, making it impossible to gain consent for some intervention. Decisions, over such interventions,
are made by external agencies (government agencies, local boards, etc.). How far should one take this
often involuntary enforcement of public health interventions? To the point of involuntary inoculation
for the greater good? Involuntary fluoridation for the common good? This is but one kind of issue;
there are many more. Ethics flows into politics too when we consider that the policies thus imposed
often constrain the liberties of people in some way or other (e.g. the enforcing of seat-belt wearing; the
banning of smoking in public places, etc.). Hence, though related to issues found in clinical medicine,
public health throws up issues that appear to be sui generis.
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to public health. Further, in order to keep the scale of this chapter manageable I
restrict my attention to those issues that are peculiar to public health.
I begin with a brief historical review of some key elements of public health
with the aim of building up a picture of what public health is and what kinds of
phenomena it deals with (a surprisingly difficult issue). I then consider definitional
issues, focusing in particular on the possible meanings of ‘public’ and ‘health’—I
briefly discuss the ‘demarcation question’ too; that is: Is public health a science
at all? This leads in to a discussion of the concepts of ‘health’ and ‘disease’ in
the public health (population) context, which in turn leads into a discussion of the
measurement of health states and disease states, and the construction of population
(or summary) measures. I then consider several epistemological issues, having to
do with causality and causal inference (using public health interventions), and the
concept of evidence in public health contexts.
2
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
It is difficult to say exactly when and where public health as a distinctive discipline
began.5 In order to answer these questions we need to know what public health
is. This in itself is very difficult since the nature of public health has evolved
considerably over time. Some prefer to focus on the quantification of properties
(relevant to health) for large groups of people, and their ‘surveillance’, providing
an evidence-base for informed interventions. Others focus on the particular ‘carto-
graphic’ methodology of finding the determinants of diseases by ‘mapping’ their
spread and charting their evolution. Both of these understandings overlap signifi-
cantly with epidemiology: in both cases the aim to to identify the causes of health
and disease (given their variation in populations). However, still others view the
connection of health and disease with social and societal issues as the defining
characteristic, so that public health involves social (or community) action. Really,
we ought to view all of these as essential components of modern public health, for
it can be viewed as placing epidemiology and statistics in the service of the wider
community (extending as far as the global community).
Let us briefly review some of these ideas in historical context to gain a bet-
ter feel for the kinds of conceptual issues that can arise in public health. In the
following historical remarks I do not aim for any kind of completeness, nor do I
present the episodes in chronological sequence. Rather, the remarks are grouped
thematically—note, however, as intimated above, that there are multiple interac-
tions between the groups.
5Good general histories of public health (portraying very different aspects) are: [Hamlin, 1998;
2005; Leavitt and Numbers, 1997; Porter, 1994; 1999; Rosen, 1993; Rosenberg, 1992; Ward and War-
ren, 2006]. As the manifold differences in these books reveal, the history of public health is an exceed-
ingly complex thing to unpack. A superb recent reader, tracing the development of public health as a
discipline, is [Schneider and Lilienfeld, 2008].
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2.1 From Vital Statistics to Biostatistics
Public health concerns large numbers of interacting people and systems. As with
any theory involving systems composed of very many subunits, public health is a
statistical science (or a discipline based on statistical science), dealing with coarse-
grained properties of wholes, rather than specific details of the parts. In this sense
public health resembles statistical physics, only now the ‘particles’ are patients,
GPs, institutions, and so on. The population-level nature of public health, and the
necessity to utilize statistics,6 was well understood by William Augustus Guy in
1870:
As hygiene deals with mankind not one by one, but in masses, its scientific method can be no other
than that numerical method so often confounded with its leading application—statistics. ([Guy, 1870])
However, the first numerical approach to epidemiology was John Grant’s develop-
ment of ‘vital statistics’ in the seventeenth century—as laid out in his Natural and
Political Observations on the Bills of Mortality. The idea of making records of
deaths (“books of the dead”) began with the plague spanning the 14th to the 16th
century. These records were used to identify and track epidemics. Incidentally,
the plague also lead to another common public health measure: quarantine. This
is a fine example of a social intervention: by preventing certain interactions from
occurring one modifies the social network and thereby prevents the spread of dis-
ease in a population. Moreover, the death rates were one of the earliest methods
of measuring the health of the public (of populations). That is, vital statistics give
one a (rough) numerical reading of the health of populations. However, the census
affords perhaps the best overview of the public’s health, enabling stratification by
race, social groupings, education, gender, and so on.7 This provides a good start-
ing basis for considering interventions to determine whether any apparent links
between properties and categories are causally implicated in health states.
Graunt’s ideas are an integral part of modern epidemiology and public health.
For example, Graunt used statistical data to monitor the health of populations:
using it to identify potential public health problems, to alert the state to such prob-
lems, or else to show that a problem was subsiding.8 He also pioneered the use
6An excellent summary of the history of statistical methods in public health is [Stroup and Berkel-
man, 1998]. The Wellcome library has a good brief historical overview of the use of statistics in public
health—see: http://library.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTL038911.html.
7A census provides us with a maximal roster of the individuals’ properties of interest. They give us
an idea of the state of the population P and its dynamics ∂ dist(P)/∂t. The census can provide snap-
shots that provide the population distribution of properties dist(P). Some quantities will be constant,
dθ/dt = 0, and these allow us to parameterize the other varying quantities. The mean µ and variance
σ2 are constant, and they determine the shape of the distribution. So: one draws up a census, and from
this one extracts the parameters θ, and this gives us the information we need to assess such things as
the ‘health state’ of a population. Of course, in reality it will be difficult if not impossible to perform a
census for all members of a population. The statisticians trick is to draw a subset that will, to varying
degrees, represent the population as a whole: this is, of course, the sample.
8This monitoring was later made a central part of Johann Peter Frank’s ‘medical police’. Both are
used as tools of the state in some sense. The idea is to have a monitoring system in place at the heart
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of the data to monitor variations in health between different populations, a notion
central to research on health inequalities (perhaps the most pressing issue facing
contemporary population health researchers—see §5). William Petty, a friend of
Graunt’s, further grounded the basis of modern public health by enjoining public
health with political and economic issues—Petty referred to the study of mortality
in populations as “political arithmetic”.9
In the nineteenth century, both William Farr and Edwin Chadwick (see next
subsection) were interested in the social interactions of health and society. Farr’s
interests were grounded more in statistics: like Graunt he viewed statistics as the
basis for social action. But, like Chadwick, he viewed the societal conditions as
in large part responsible for the health state of a population, and for differences
between the health of populations. Farr was statistician to the General Registrar
Office, a post which saw him formulate and investigate many basic principles of
epidemiology and public health. His basic aim was fundamentally a public health
related one: to prevent and control disease (cf. [Adelstein and Susser, 1976], p.
iii).
Francis Galton and Karl Pearson were responsible for the development of the
field of biostatistics which replaced vital statistics. Biostatistics deals with data
derived from all manner of studies pertaining to medicine and biology. Its lessons
were propagated into the epidemiological community, and so applied to public
health-related studies, by Major Greenwood, Wade Hampton Frost, Bradford Hill
and others. Biostatistics was primarily a clinical affair. However, the introduction
of computers and the availability of vast databases and the potential to simulate
complex processes, and make forecasts of complex processes, has led to the field
of ‘public health informatics’. This is an amalgam of public health, engineering
and technology. This technology is, and will continue to increase so as to include
more variables of interest. For example, there has recently been an integration of
GIS (geographical information systems) technology to allow for more expansive
surveillance.10 The internet too allows for more detailed comparisons of statis-
tics. A substantial component of biostatistics is public health surveillance. See
[O’Carroll et al., 2002] for more details on these recent developments.
Another recent development in the use of statistics in public health is in the area
of meta-analysis; namely, the statistical synthesis of evidence gathered from multi-
of the health system, and on whose data one can act: in Frank’s era this involved the quarantining and
disinfecting of the ‘unclean’ elements in order to have a growing, fit population. In the former case it
is in place to alert the health care agencies to public health threats. For a recent collection of technical
articles dealing with aspects of public health surveillance, see [Teutsch and Churchill, 2000]—see also
[Thacker et al., 1989] for a good brief review.
9Another interesting development was Christian Huygen’s’ development of ‘life tables’ to deter-
mine the life expectancy of individuals (at any age), for use in computing life annuities. See Chapter 8
of [Hald, 2003] for an excellent account of this history.
10See [Cromley and McLafferty, 2002] and [Elliot et al., 2001] for accessible introductions to the
applications of GIS to public health. For a historical survey of the ‘mapping’ of disease, up to and
including GIS, see [Koch, 2005].
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ple independent studies.11 There are many issues of philosophical interest lurking
in the way the evidence is synthesized in these analyses—see §3 of [Worrall, 2007]
for a good discussion of the conceptual issues that arise.
2.2 Social and Environmental Dimensions of Health and Disease
In an early discussion of the role of statistics and statisticians in public health,
Edgar Sydenstricker argues that although “medicine” can be viewed as “synony-
mous with public health”, the latter has in addition “a social objective” ([Syden-
stricker, 1928], p. 116). The understanding of public health has in very large
part been guided by societal issues. Abdelmonem and Breslow refer, in this re-
gard, to the “dynamic nature of public health” ([1994], p. 224). The emergence
of certain novel types of behaviour (due to evolving norms) and the development
of new technologies can bring with them new threats to health that simply did not
previously exist. For example, industrialization brings with it a greater likelihood
of certain kinds of epidemic. The invention of new forms of transport will mod-
ify epidemiology and public health due to the new types of injury that can occur.
Moreover, greater success in healthcare can, ironically, bring with it its own prob-
lems, such as an increased aging population (demanding new specialisms such as
gerontology) and a population explosion.
Of course, it isn’t only changes in society that can cause the emergence of new
public health threats. The physical environment is implicated too and can radically
alter the distribution of health and disease (famine is an obvious example of this).
Moreover, the social and the physical are often bound together, so that changes
in one will modify the other. As Geoffrey Rose writes, the “scale and pattern of
disease reflect the way that people live and their social, economic, and environ-
mental circumstances, and all of these can change quickly” ([Rose, 1992], p. 1).
These elements have been investigated and conceptualized in a variety of ways.
For example, the emerging diseases of nineteenth century England were hypoth-
esized to be a result of the insanitary conditions that resulted from overcrowding.
Likewise, overwork, malnutrition and other (what we would now think of as) ‘so-
cial dimensions of disease’ were isolated as part of public health in the Chadwick
report [Chadwick, 1842]—similar conclusions were made slightly later in the US
in the Shattuck report [Shattuck, 1850]. The isolation and analysis of such prob-
lems (using primarily epidemiological studies) were intimately linked with a plan
of action to intervene for the betterment of society.
Edwin Chadwick is often taken to have been an advocate of social-wide en-
vironmental interventions via sanitary reform. In this goal he was aided by the
statistical work of William Farr (see §2.1). However, Sylvia Tesh [1995] has ar-
gued that that Chadwick was not so disposed, and that his concerns were firmly
11Note that this is not the same as a systematic review, which does not necessarily involve statistical
manipulation: a meta-analysis constitutes a particular kind of systematic review. See [Egger et al.,
2001] for the canonical text on systematic reviews (including meta-analyses).
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grounded in ‘miasma theory’. This often pointed to interventions that had their lo-
cation in conditions of poverty, to do with water supply and sewers. The target was
miasma producing things, not the social setup per se. Tesh’s claim is, then, that the
miasma theory led to the particular public health prevention measures (many that
were, indeed, loaded with societal significance). Hence, though sanitarianism led
to what looks like social reform, it was more a technical fix rather than a matter of
social justice.12
Hamlin [1995] agrees with this general idea, but takes issue with this claim that
“aetiological theory drives preventative strategy”, arguing that there are plenty of
cases of under-determination (in which one theory generates multiple preventative
strategies) and over-determination (in which multiple theories correspond to the
same strategy). His examples focus on cases whereby miasmatic theory can be
dealt with either at the level of social conditions (poverty reduction and so on) or
at more direct level of contagion (sanitation upgrades and so on).
Mendelsohn [1995], on the other hand, argues that the whole distinction be-
tween ‘social’ and ‘physical’ (environmental) is without a real difference, or is,
at least, not so easy to support as most discussions suppose. That is, it is easy
to assign ‘poverty’ to either the social side or the physical side; it can be viewed
as a social condition, a physiological, or a physical condition. Given this, the
distinction cannot do any real work in this context. However, the idea that individ-
uals’ health status is connected to the social structures they find themselves in has
recently become very fashionable. Social epidemiology, for example, highlights
just this ‘social embededness’ of individuals. The health states of individuals are
not intrinsic properties, but are determined by the social networks in which the
individuals find themselves: transporting an individual to another context would
change the health profile of that individual (cf. [Galea and Putnam, 2007], p. 7).13
The key role of public health on this account is, then, to modify the environment
(or ‘context’) in such a way as to benefit the individuals occupying it. The envi-
ronment itself then becomes the subject of the adjectives ’sick’ and ’healthy’—see
[Rose, 2001].
Not surprisingly, this modification of the social and physical environment is
what those interested in the ethical consequences of public health find objection-
able: the modification is enforced, and not to the benefit of all (most often, in fact,
12Virginia Berridge [2007] discusses the Health of Towns Association—an environmental public
health intervention advocacy group—that was formed after the publication of Chadwick’s report. This
group was instrumental in the promotion of sanitary reform and is often held up as a particularly ‘moral’
movement. However, as with Chadwick, Berridge argues (following the work of Chris Hamlin), the
group was convinced that “the problem was sewers and not deprivation” (p. 22): it was firmly grounded
in the (erroneous) miasmatic theory of disease.
13There is a whiff of the debate between (semantic) ‘externalists’ and ‘internalists’ here. That debate
concerns what a speaker means by some word: is it determined by social and physical factors external
to the speaker, or is it determined by factors about the speaker? Or, to put it another way: do physical
duplicates always mean the same thing by their words regardless of the external social and physical
environment? The social epidemiologist is, in this sense, a kind of externalist about health: an individ-
ual’s health does not supervene on it’s intrinsic properties. See [Putnam, 1975] for the original source
of this debate.
8 DEAN RICKLES
for economic reasons). For example, if I stop a shuttle service taking students be-
tween campuses, and build a nice connecting footpath, then that will force them to
look for alternative methods, with the hope that many will walk or use a bicycle,
and therefore reduce the burden of disease for the population as a whole. This
amounts to an involuntary modification in the behaviour patterns of individuals.
The benefit to the population as a whole might be worth the cost (i.e. in health-
economic terms), but it might well also be the case that numerous individuals are
adversely affected—perhaps dropping out of college, and so on.14
In many ways, the recent introduction of this ‘social epidemiology’ harks back
to the very earliest public health work of Hippocrates, who also considered the
impact of the social and physical environments of health (in his work Airs, Wa-
ters, Places for example).15 His evidential basis was observational: certain places,
with certain social systems and physical conditions appear to be correlated with
quite specific health conditions. Weather, for example, was found to be correlated
with specific disease patterns, as was the status of the water supply. Of course,
the precise nature of the effects of the natural environment on health (that is, the
mechanisms responsible) were not known at the time—for that, one requires the
integration of this ‘social medicine’ with biomedicine. Before the idea of local
contagion theory (according to which an ‘agent’ is passed between individual or
from a source to an individual), leading to germ theory, the common view was that
‘miasma’ was responsible for the spread of disease—simply by inhaling foul air,
one would be exposed. Though this was the ‘wrong theory’, it can nonetheless
prove effective in reducing the incidence of disease, since one will tend to cover
the airways, and so reduce the risk of infection, and remove the sources of the
stench which can simultaneously serve to remove the bacteria (the ‘true cause’).
Given this, one could be forgiven for thinking that interventions based on the mias-
matic theory, being successful, constituted good evidence for the theory (given the
state of knowledge at the time)—that is to say, there were good rational reasons
for believing the theory.
Before leaving this subsection, I briefly note that the so-called ‘new public
health’ bears many similarities to social epidemiology: it is a sociological ap-
proach. The basic idea is that threats to health go beyond infectious diseases and
lifestyle risks, and can originate in social organization and structures (cf. [Baum,
1990]). This belief motivates advocacy of implementing structural social changes
in order to improve health. Again, it suggests a kind of externalist conception of
health states. The new public health is also characterized by a greater linkage to the
state than previously. Legislation in the form of public health acts serve to control
risky activities. Risk is also at the root of legislative action in the context of infec-
14This is known as ‘the prevention paradox’, though it isn’t really a paradox as such: ‘prevention
dilemma’ would perhaps be a more appropriate label. See §3.5 for more on this matter.
15Note, however, that Hippocrates advocated the ‘humoral theory of disease’, according to which
disease comes about when there is an imbalance amongst the four humors, blood, phlegm, yellow bile,
and black bile. This theory suggests physiological treatments that restore the balance (cf. [Thagard,
2005], p. 48).
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tious individuals; the state can detain such individuals if they are deemed to pose a
sufficient threat to the public’s health. In this sense public health is an object in its
own right; something to be moulded and altered. However, as we saw, this political
connection can be found in the work of Chadwick, who was in fact employed as
assistant to the royal commission set up to investigate the Poor Laws. This work
unearthed the terrible conditions that England’s poor were subject to. However, as
mentioned previously, Chadwick’s concerns were more economic than than social
justice ones. But the results were nonetheless consequential in social justice terms:
by eliminating the filth that encouraged disease cholera, for one, was brought under
control.16 Squalor, rather than poverty, was thought to be the root of the problem.
Disease, rather, was thought to be a cause of poverty. Hence, the various reforms,
associated with sanitary engineering, were intended to reduce disease with the aim
of stimulating the economy.
2.3 The Germ Theory of Disease
The bacteriological theory of disease, of Pasteur, Koch and others17, identified
the precise biological organisms responsible for the transmission of infectious dis-
eases. Germ theory reduced the spread of disease to the transmission of these
bacteria.18 Hence, the causes of diseases were conceptualized as local biological
impingements. A key move was Koch’s isolation and culturing of the tuberculosis
virus, and his demonstration that tuberculosis could be artificially induced in an-
imals. This engineered production of disease (or rather, the fact that it served to
establish the germ theory of disease) appears to constitute an instance of Hacking’s
‘entity realist’ stance: causality, manipulability, and reality were bound together—
see [Marcum, 2008] (pp. 33–48) for more along these lines.
Public health, qua non-local theory of the determinants of human health, suf-
fered somewhat at the hands of this new local and individualistic theory of disease
and illness.19 However, public health has been concerned throughout its existence
(however blurry the origins might be) with disease (however that might be under-
stood) and advances in microbiology were quickly integrated into public health
16Though not, of course, caused disease, as per the theories of disease aetiology at the time—see the
next subsection.
17I should perhaps point out that Koch was not much impressed with Pasteur’s methodology. As
Latour points out, Koch thought that Pasteur’s generalization from his vaccinated sheep to a “general
method, applicable to all infectious diseases” was somewhat “hasty” ([Latour, 1988], p. 29; cf. [Guala,
2003], p. 1195). Koch, of course, developed precise postulates that gave the necessary and sufficient
conditions for inferring bacterial causation [Koch, 1882]. [Evans, 1993] gives a good historical survey
of the interconnections between theories of disease and theories of causation. For a more ‘revisionist’
history, see [Worboy, 2000].
18As Thagard ([Thagard, 2005], p. 48) notes, the germ theory is a class of theories that applies to
multiple specific disease types, each with their own specific infectious agents, from protozoa, to fungi,
to prions.
19As Mervyn Susser [1985] points out, this can be explained in Kuhnian terms: the non-local,
population-based ideas (the miasma paradigm) was replaced by a paradigm based on the Henle-Koch
postulates involving the determination of disease-causation.
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(again highlighting the latter’s adaptability) and used as both a way of identifying
disease and as a means of intervening so as to eliminate it. One of the most signif-
icant developments along these lines was the establishing of local and government
public health departments whose initial role was to keep an eye on the status of
populations vis-a`-vis communicable diseases. The infrastructure cemented for this
purpose was quickly expanded for other means, such as screening programmes.
The idea of an agency responsible for the control and monitoring of infectious
diseases was later, in 1948, implemented at the international level by the United
Nations in the form of The World Health Organization [WHO]—of course, the
remit of the WHO is now way beyond infectious diseases, extending to various
demographic issues that are believed to have health impacts.20
Epidemiology and public health are concerned with the spread of disease. This
has often been done at a more coarse-grained level. Molecular epidemiology links
molecular biology to epidemiology and public health by providing transmission
mechanisms for the spread of disease and potential responses to stop the transmis-
sion. Genetic screening and engineering also offers the promise of greater con-
trol over the spread of disease, and even the promise to entirely wipe out certain
diseases. Less grandiosely it offers the potential for more targeted intervention
strategies. Hence, the local, biomedical model is utilized by public health and can
be merged with the more global issues more characteristic of the latter’s way of
operating.
2.4 Epidemiology and Public Health
In their article on the connections between epidemiology and public health, Abra-
ham and David Lilienfeld conclude with the statement that “without public health,
there is no epidemiology” ([Lilienfeld and Lilienfeld, 1982], p. 148). They trace
this intimate connection largely through the public health movement, which in-
cludes figures we have already discussed, notably W. A. Guy. The Lilienfeld’s ar-
gued that there was an increasing disconnect between the two fields (ibid., p. 147).
Milton Terris [1987] ultimately concurs with the Lilienfeld’s about the tight rela-
tions between epidemiology and public health, but argues that there is an emerg-
ing tightening once again in what he calls a “second epidemiologic revolution” (p.
327), in which the domain of epidemiology is expanded to include all manner of
non-infectious diseases.
Combining the numerical methods (quantifying cases) with information about
the populations from which the cases are drawn from is characteristic of mod-
ern epidemiology and really began with John Snow’s isolation of the Bow Street
Pump as the source of a cholera epidemic propagated through human waste. The
basic methodological details of this approach were made more rigorous by William
Farr, who formulated many more concepts of modern epidemiology—specifically,
20The WHO has an excellent online historical collection, accessible at: http://www.who.int/
library/collections/historical/en/. This resource has material going back to 1507.
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Snow utilized Farr’s tabulations relating cholera mortality to water supply and
based his hypothesis—about the nature of cholera and its propagation via an organ-
ism passed though human waste—on this data. The hypothesis was tested using
the weekly mortality tables supplied by Farr. Of course, as mentioned above, at
this stage it was not known that the cholera bacillus was the agent responsible for
the disease, but the success of the intervention did not depend on this knowledge.
Though controlled experiments in public health contexts are extraordinarily
difficult, for a variety of reasons (e.g. complexity, ethics, etc.), when they are
possible they constitute the most reliable way of generating evidence and testing
hypotheses—if conducted correctly, that is, with the right number of trial arms and
the right experimental subjects (or units). The modern idea of performing trials (or
sampling) to test determinants of health and disease was instigated in the scurvy
trial of James Lind. Lind gathered a group of sailors stricken with scurvy and split
them up in to various pairs, each pair given a different supplement to their usual
diet. The pair that was given citrus fruits recovered. This result was used to infer
the causal efficacy of citrus fruit in curing scurvy—later biomedical work deter-
mined that it was specifically the vitamin C component of citrus fruits that did the
work. This evidence could then be used to prevent cases of scurvy from occurring,
thus demonstrating how a clinical trial can be used in the service of public health.
A similar trial was conducted by Ignaz Semmelweiss (in the 1840s) to test a
hypothesis about the causal factor responsible for the difference in the incidence
of puerperal fever within maternity wards operated by midwives (in training) and
those run by physicians (who also conducted autopsies). Semmelweiss conjec-
tured that there was some infection as a result of the autopsy work (transmitted by
‘cadaverous particles’). To test this he simply instigated measures to cleanse hands
prior to deliveries. The rates between the wards balanced out. It is worth spelling
out the details of this case.
In fact, Hempel considers this case in his Philosophy of Natural Science [Hempel,
1966]. Donald Gillies [2005] examines Hempel’s analysis, and argues that it needs
to be supplemented by elements of Kuhnian philosophy (in order to make sense
of Semmelweiss’ failure to convince the wider medical community that his ideas
were sound). Gillies notes that Semmelweiss’ methodology was largely in line
with Popper’s model of conjectures and refutations: hypotheses were suggested
and then tested experimentally by appropriate interventions.21 The first hypothe-
sis was that “atmospheric-cosmic-terrestrial” factors were responsible—as Gillies
notes, this is another way of referring to the miasmatic theory (ibid., pp. 161-
162). This was quickly rejected by noting that these would be constant across the
wards (given their close proximity), and so could not be called upon to account
for the observed differences in death rates. A government commission established
to investigate the curious differences came up with the theory that differences in
the way the patients were handled were responsible, in one case involving rough
21Peter Lipton also considered Hempel’s treatment of Semmelweiss and argued that it constituted an
instance of inference to the best explanation ([Lipton, 1991], pp. 75-98).
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student medics (often foreign) and in the other case involving more delicate (non-
foreign!) student midwives. The rationale is that this was another difference be-
tween the groups, and one needs a difference in the cause to get a difference in
the effect. However, Semmelweiss performed a test involving the canceling out of
the suggested causal factors (by making the groups comparable), so that the wards
were balanced with respect to them, but found no significant reduction.22
It was new background evidence—concerning the death of a colleague by an
infection from a knife wound during an autopsy resulting in something similar
to puerperal fever—that brought about the breakthrough. He surmised that since
some of the doctors go from autopsy to clinic they might be transmitting the same
material during their examinations. The midwives, on the other hand, do not con-
duct autopsies. By implementing a trial of thorough disinfection of the hands
following autopsies Semmelweiss was finally able to balance out the death rates.
The disinfection was generalized from post-autopsy situations to any medical ex-
amination involving “ichor” (that is, discharge emanating from a wound). Further
generalization to airborne transmission of “ichorous particles” followed other in-
cidents, resulting in the isolation of those presenting with such wounds.
Gillies, as mentioned, views the hypothetico-deductive account espoused by
Hempel to be incomplete: it doesn’t offer an account of why Semmelweis’ theory
was not adopted given the strength of evidence. Gillies argues that Kuhn’s model
can provide an easy answer: “the theory ... was rejected because it contradicted the
then dominant paradigm concerning the causation of disease” ([Gillies, 2005], p.
171)—it contradicted both the miasmatic theory and the contagion theory, making
Semmelweis a revolutionary.
However, both of these trials are rather small-scale, though the Semmelweis
trial was carried out at the level of wards (a population of sorts), rather than in-
dividuals. Modern day public health trials can involve entire neighbourhoods! In
such cases, observational studies and natural experiments (in which one utilizes
coincidentally matching systems) are the alternative. In many respects Snow’s de-
termination of the Broad Street pump as the source of a cholera epidemic was a
perfect natural experiment: that is, a confluence of circumstances that have con-
spired, naturally (without intervention), to bring about what looks like a controlled
experiment, with multiple groups one of which has ‘the intervention’ and other
which doesn’t. In this case the groups (the population at risk) are those who sub-
scribed to water from the Southwark and Vauxhall Company (with contaminated
water from the Thames) and those subscribing to water from the Lambeth Com-
pany (with water fed from further upstream, and without sewage contamination).
What’s more, the groups appear to be well-matched in other covariates, so that no
confounding would seem to be at work—i.e. if the Lambeth Company customers
22Gillies also notes an even more surprising hypothesis involving a Priest ringing a bell on the way to
give the last sacrament to a dying patient (ibid, p. 163). There were differences in the Priest’s trajectory
to patients brought about by the arrangement of the rooms, that were correlated with the difference in
death rates: the experience of the ringing bell was thought to have some deathly psychological effect.
Again, Semmelweiss controlled for this and again found no difference.
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had to pay more for that service then they would likely be richer and in better
health anyway. The choice of service provider was fairly random.
Indeed, one could not hope for a better experimental setup if one tried, and
Snow was well aware of this, writing:
Now it must be evident that, if the diminution of cholera, in the districts partly supplied with improved
water, depended on this supply, the houses receiving it would be the houses enjoying the whole benefit
of the diminution of the malady, whilst the houses supplied with the [impure] water from Battersea
Fields would suffer the same mortality as they would if the improved supply did not exist at all. As
there is no difference whatever in the houses or the people receiving the supply of the two Water
Companies, or in any of the physical conditions with which they are surrounded, it is obvious that no
experiment could have been devised which would more thoroughly test the effect of water supply on
the progress of cholera than this, which circumstances placed ready made before the observer. ([Snow,
1855], p. 74)
By finding out how many houses each company supplied water to, and then finding
out how many deaths occurred in each (Lambeth supplied versus Southwark and
Vauxhall supplied) Snow was able to prove that if one took water from Southwark
and Vauxhall one was 14 times more likely to suffer a fatal infection. Although no
experimental control is exerted here, given the matching (in ‘relevant respects’),
inferences are well supported. Of course, though an intervention suggests itself,
there is no mechanism specified, and no ‘low level’ underlying theory. Hence, this
constitutes a paradigm instance of ‘black box’ epidemiology (also known as ‘risk
factor epidemiology’). It is a perfectly legitimate and often very effective way
of stopping the transmission of diseases—see [Greenland et al., 2004] for a recent
defense. One might not know the exact mechanism underlying the transmission, or
what is being transmitted (‘the agent’), but if one knows that certain behaviours or
events lead to transmission then then is sufficient to be able to put an intervention
into operation. Naturally, a ‘deeper’ account would most likely result in more
effective (and more efficient) preventative measures, and perhaps eradication of
the disease.23 However, if necessary, black box studies can often point the way to
such studies.
2.5 Modern Public Health
The previous discussion highlights the fact that there are two broad, apparently
competing strands of public health: a biomedical strand and a socio-economic
strand. These are woven together by epidemiology, which utilizes results concern-
ing one to impact on the other. Modern public health places more emphasis on the
‘macrosocial determinants’ of health, than was common during the earlier parts
of the twentieth century, with its focus tending to be more on the biomedical as-
pects of health. We saw that the view that the social and physical environment
plays a role in determining health has played a crucial role in the development of
23Note that this is a moot point. Social epidemiologists would argue that the best preventative mea-
sures come from imposing measures ‘upstream’ (i.e. focusing on more distal social causes). We shall
return to this controversy several times in subsequent sections.
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public health and epidemiology. Writing specifically about the treatment of tuber-
culosis, Winslow argued that intervening in social aspects, through the education
of individuals for example, “has proved almost as far reaching in its results as
the discovery of the germ theory of disease thirty years before” [Winslow, 1923].
Moreover, new kinds of theories about non-infectious diseases have emerged in
the twentieth century, such as lupus, genetic diseases, and cancer. Theories con-
cerning the social causes of diseases have begun to take shape recently too. This
suggests that all components, statistics, sociology, bacteriology, and epidemiol-
ogy, are necessary for the proper functioning of public health. The current trend
appears to suggest greater integration of these elements in the future.
3
WHAT IS PUBLIC HEALTH?
In the previous section we got to grips with several key themes in the historical
development of public health as a discipline. In this section we consider the ques-
tion of how to define public health, and what assumptions and implications the
proposed definitions involve.
3.1 A Catalogue of Definitions
In the latest edition of The Oxford Textbook of Public Health, public health is
defined as “the process of mobilizing and engaging local, state, national, and in-
ternational resources to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy”
([Detels and Breslow, 2005], p. 3). This emphasis on social engineering, and com-
munity action, points to a notion of ‘infrastructure’: public health provides some
underlying structure necessary to support the health of the overlying public. It is
a substructure that enables to prevention of disease, the support of the sick, and
responses to emergencies. The substructure is often more intangible than bricks
and mortar: social norms are required to make many public health ventures go.
This definition is more or less identical to the US Institute of Medicine’s, which
states that the “mission” of public health involves “fulfilling society’s interest in
assuring conditions in which people can be healthy” ([U.S. Institute of Medicine,
1988], p. 40). This is clearly intended to be normative as well as descriptive.
The mission is implemented through “organized community efforts aimed at the
prevention of disease and the promotion of health” (ibid., p. 41). The organiza-
tional framework within which this is carried out includes “activities undertaken
within the formal structure of government and the associated efforts of private and
voluntary organizations and individuals” (ibid., p. 42). Again, the emphasis is on
community and action—see [Beauchamp, 1985] for an engaging study of these
aspects.
The model for these definitions, and almost all recent definitions, is C. -E. A.
Winslow’s canonical definition as:
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The science and the art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical health and ef-
ficiency through organized community efforts for the sanitation of the environment, the control of
community infections, the education of the individual in principles of personal hygiene, the organi-
zation of medical and nursing services for the early diagnosis and preventative treatment of disease,
and the development of the social machinery which will ensure to every individual in the community a
standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health. ([Winslow, 1923], p.1)
The implementation of this vision is aided by informatics and epidemiology. Often
there is public health action without identification of the actual causes of some
phenomenon. One does not need a mechanism to use epidemiological results in
decisions. Public health often proceeds without theory. This much paints an ‘aim
oriented’ picture of public health.
The early WHO definition of health as “a state of complete physical, mental,
and social well-being” ([1947], p. 1) has been the subject of a lot of criticism.
The main objection is that it is too strong to ever be satisfied by actual individuals.
However I think this misses the point somewhat. The definition should be viewed
as an ideal towards which our public health activities should strive—in this sense
it too is aim-oriented. Naturally, any individual’s health state will only ever be an
approximation of ‘complete well-being’, but, the idea would seem to be, the state
can nonetheless be shifted closer to the ideal. However, understood this way it
nonetheless has its problems. For example, it does not give any information on
how to achieve (or approximate) this golden state—in short it makes absolutely
no reference to the determinants of health and to the methods by which one might
intervene. Even as an ideal then, it is useless. Moreover, we might rightly inquire
as to what “well-being” is, if not health by a different name. In the next subsections
we examine the notion of public health in more detail.
3.2 Narrow Versus Broad Conceptions
Verweij and Dawson [2003] distinguish “broad” versus “narrow” conceptions of
public health. Their focus is a demarcation issue: what counts as a public health
problem? On the one hand, according to a narrow (or traditional) conception,
public health is concerned with such things as the environment’s impact on health,
screening programmes, infectious diseases, education campaigns, and so on. A
broader conception would focus on less direct aspects, such as socioeconomic and
cultural factors. I prefer to call these ‘local’ and ‘nonlocal’ since they concern
factors that act directly on individuals in the former case and more indirectly in the
latter case.
As Verweij and Dawson point out, the problem the nonlocalists have with the
local account is that the latter fails to capture all possible (reasonable) determinants
of health: “[if] public health is primarily about prevention in its widest sense [then]
true prevention will have to focus on all of the causes of public health problems”
(ibid., p. 16). In other words, according to the nonlocal account, everything (no
matter how non-proximal) will be included in public health if it does indeed have
an impact on the health of individuals. This all-inclusive approach clearly has
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its own problems. Verweij and Dawson object that “such a conception of public
health could be limitless, as almost all human activities (and many inactivities)
may affect health” (ibid., p. 17). This is true, but one might respond by pointing
to the fact that not all contributions to public health will be equally weighted. That
is, the fact that public health problems are essentially limitless does not mean that
they cannot be prioritized. Some factors will play a much lesser role than others,
and so one should naturally devote more attention to those. Likewise, some factors
may be easier to intervene in than others and so one should focus on those. There
are no doubt many other prioritization criteria that one could employ to decide
which factors to focus on, and these will most likely be suggested by the context.
3.3 The ‘Public’ Aspect of Public Health
Verweij and Dawson go on to distinguish two senses of ‘public’ in ‘public health’.
Firstly, they follow Geoffrey Rose [2001] who takes ‘public’ to refer to a popu-
lation of individuals so that public health refers to the collective health state of
the population. In other words, the basic system of public health is the population
rather than the individual. This system, like an individual, can have a health state
that can be measured, tracked, compared to other systems, and modified. Sec-
ondly, they point to the methodology of implementing interventions at the popu-
lation level, or through collective (public) action: “Taken as a whole, we propose
that the practice of public health (roughly) consists of collective interventions that
aim to promote the health of the public” ([Verweij and Dawson, 2003], p. 21).
This seems to follow Winslow’s lead once again; however, in this case we have
implicitly spelt out what is meant by ‘public’. The sense so given contrasts with
Winslow’s idea of ensuring good health for the individuals in a community, for
here we have what sounds like a more utilitarian notion of collective health in
which the individual members are secondary.
This conception of public health seems to map onto Beauchamp’s understand-
ing. He argues that public health ought to be an instrument of social justice
[Beauchamp, 1976]. His target is the notion of ‘market justice’ (this should re-
ally be free market justice), the idea that a system should be left to its own devices
to self-organize, and this way individual freedoms are left alone. However, as in
the economic sphere, what we find in market justice worlds are (power law) in-
equalities: most people have very poor health and living conditions while very few
(in terms of percentages) have exceptional health. A social justice understanding
would seek to lessen this inequality to the point at which inequalities are no longer
inequities (minimal conditions necessary for good health). The right to some spec-
ified minimal level is fundamental according to social justice approaches.
3.4 The ‘Health’ Aspect of Public Health
Christopher Boorse treats the problem of defining ‘health’ in great detail in his
chapter; for now we just briefly discuss a few salient points as they relate to the
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definition of public health—the shift to public health does introduce novel as-
pects to this much discussed problem. The key issue to consider here, I think,
is whether there is a plurality of concepts (of health and disease), depending on
whether one is studying health-related phenomena at the individual or population
level, or whether these concepts are of the ‘one size fits all’ variety. We return
to this in subsequent sections, for now it will be instructive to see if the standard
answers to the question of what health is are equally applicable in public health.
Kitcher distinguishes between two broad conceptions in the understanding of
disease (and so, by extension, health):
Objectivism: “there are facts about the human body on which the notion of dis-
ease is founded, and that with a clear grasp of those facts we would have no
trouble drawing lines, even in challenging cases” ([Kitcher, 1997], p. 208).
Constructivism: objectivism “is an illusion ... the disputed cases reveal how the
values of different social groups conflict, rather than exposing any ignorance
of fact, and that disagreement is sometimes even produced because of uni-
versal acceptance of a system of values” (ibid., p. 209).
One can find many (not necessarily equivalent) variations on this distinction in
the literature. For example, Lennox [1995] speaks in terms of “reductionists” and
“relativists”. One can also find a distinction between “naturalists” and “norma-
tivists” (see [Amundson, 2000] for example). However, at the root of all of these
is the ‘fact/value’ distinction: does our understanding of disease and health involve
value-judgements, and if so do these judgements cloud the objectivity of our talk
of health and disease or can fact and value peacefully coexist? Naturalists, objec-
tivists, and reductionists will generally wish to say that the concepts of health and
disease are value-free theoretical concepts that occur in the health sciences: they
will likely wish to base their philosophical understanding of the concepts on the
scientific understanding of them. Normativists, relativists, and constructivists will
deny this, taking the concepts of health and disease to be value-laden (with attri-
butions of ‘disease’ reflecting our disapproval and ‘health’ reflecting what we find
desirable), subject to change, and in no way ‘carving nature at its joints’. Does this
debate transfer over to the public health context?
Clearly, many of the definitions of health that have been offered in the biomed-
ical realm will not be applicable in the public health context on the grounds that
many of them make specific reference to humans and the human body or to the
biological function of organisms. One might extend some of the definitions by
taking ‘body’ and ‘organism’ to mean any organized system involving biological
components. However, if taken to be a defining condition of the general concept
of disease it threatens to be over-applicable (on the grounds that there are many
systems with biological components, not all of which deserve the attributions of
health and disease states). Having said this, depending on our philosophical pro-
clivities, we might wish to generalize the concepts even wider, so that they are
applicable to any system whatsoever. I mentioned earlier, for example, that we
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speak of the health of financial markets. However, this is usually understood to be
a metaphor rather than any indication of the nature of the reality of markets.
The idea that health and disease at the population level are value-laden might
be considered more appropriate since populations do not seem to be natural kinds
in the way that organisms are often taken to be. However, we need not necessarily
make reference to natural kinds. According to Boorse’s naturalistic theory, for
example, disease, is biological disfunction (and health the absence of it). Let us
present the four components of his ‘Biostatistical Theory’ ([Boorse, 1997], p. 7,
as presented in [Schwartz, 2007], p. 52):
1. The reference class is a natural of organisms of uniform functional design; specifically, an age
group or a sex of a species.
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the reference class is a statistically
typical contribution by it to their individual survival and reproduction.
3. A disease is a type of internal state, which is either an impairment of normal functional ability,
i.e. a reduction of one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency, or a limitation on
functional ability caused by environmental agents.
4. Health is the absence of disease.
Hence, we get the view that health is simply the absence of disease, where disease
is given by statistical subnormality of biological function (defined by reference to
survival and reproduction) in a (stratified) reference class of organisms.
The idea that disease is abnormal function (if we consider ‘abnormal’ to be
deviation from a normal curve) might look initially appealing since public health
is based on statistics. We might take populations with health properties that are
normally distributed to be ‘healthy’ ones. If we have a skewed distribution or one
with fat tails then this points to inequalities and, therefore (perhaps) functional in-
efficiency. One can consider the distributions of certain properties to be indicators
of healthy and unhealthy populations. As we see in §4, something like this forms
the basis of so-called ‘summary measures of population health’, namely measures
of health that roll up individual-level health data into a single number taken to be
representative of health and disease in the global system.
However, so understood, this proposal faces a simple problem in that the de-
termination of health status is a relative matter: one could have a distribution re-
flecting very little by way of inequality, and yet in which the individual events
making up the distribution are all very low (in the sense of low life expectancy, for
example)—or, in other words, the distribution is distributed ‘healthily’ according
to this proposal, but the individual health levels are very low. Conversely, in a
society were the majority of people suffer extreme depression (because of some
tragic accident perhaps), then this registers itself in the statistics: it is ‘normal’ to
have extreme depression. Those who don’t suffer are diseased. There is an easy
response to such problems: health and disease are independent of our labels. Just
because we do and do not choose to call certain patterns and states ‘diseased’ and
‘healthy’ does not mean that there is a genuine correspondence. However, Boorse’s
definition involves the notion of normal function, not normality simpliciter. Mere
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statistical normality is not sufficient to determine health; one must look at how
some state is linked up with matters of function and efficiency. Lennox points
to the fact that one might need to look to the population level in order to deter-
mine these latter aspects ([1995], p. 508), by looking at correlations between the
variable of interest and variables that are directly linked to mortality (for it is the
maintenance of life that guides Lennox’s approach). However, we approach the
problem, it is clear that values will enter at some point, if only in the weighting of
health states in terms of severity.
A more pragmatic approach, one that I will flesh out later on, would argue
that it is nonsense to try to pin down a unique definition of health and disease
independently of one’s interests and the uses to which the concepts are being put
to. This filters through into the (operational) construction of population measures
of health and disease—that is, the approach maps onto actual scientific practice.
Here there are very many such measures, and one can pick and choose according to
task: if one is interested in resource allocation then one can focus on an approach
to health that is insensitive to many aspects that one could not ignore if one was
interested in equity issues, or in whether it was right to intervene in some property.
We return to this issue again in the context of health measures in §4.
3.5 Prevention versus Cure
A corollary to the individual/population distinction (discussed in §3.3), though not
a strictly necessary one, is the distinct aims that are associated with individual and
population level approaches to health. There is an epistemic difference embedded
in this difference in aims: the preventative measure concentrates as much focus on
‘unknowns’ as it does on ‘knowns’. In the clinical encounter, the focus is on some
presentation of disease in an individual with the aim of diagnosing the disease and
finding a cure. Public health, on the other hand, will tend to focus on a disease-
free population, with the aim of keeping it that way. The notion of prevention in
public health overlaps with the issue of aetiology. A public health programme will
usually isolate causes in a different way than to clinical health practice in the sense
that a more ‘distal’ cause will be deemed responsible for some health problem so
that interventions (if used) will be applied at different sites.
Furthermore, as Rose points out ([Rose, 1992], pp. 12-13), according to the
preventative strategy the benefit to individuals can be very small (and even neg-
ative: say a loss of earnings). As Rose puts it himself: “a preventative measure
that brings large benefits to the community offers little to each participating indi-
vidual” (p. 12). The gain is at the population level. Rose accepts the tough side
of prevention, including the seeming necessity of alteration of norms of behaviour
and the social fabric to achieve the desired effects.24 Naturally this level of control
invites ethical commentary—but that is not my concern here. Rose’s point is that a
24For example, by altering the social status quo for smoking one does not need the distant incentive
of better health, one can rely on the immediate social disapproval that smoking generates.
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truly preventative science must involve a thorough knowledge of the determinants
of what it is one seeks to prevent: disease. And, likewise, of what one seeks to
promote: health. Once these have been isolated then one can intervene so as to get
the optimal situation. In the ideal case one will no longer need such strategies as
screening programmes and such like: the root cause will longer be in operation.
This seems rather over-optimistic. Even if the causes could be isolated, it isn’t
clear that one could persuade a whole population (or even most of a population)
to engage in practices that are often of minimal individual benefit. On the latter
problem Rose suggests that one adopt a “high-risk strategy” involving the specific
targeting “of those individuals who are judged most likely to develop disease”
(ibid., p. 13). The strategy depends then, as one might expect, on the distribution
of risk in a population. If the risk is spread fairly uniformly over a population then
a “population strategy” (a mass strategy) is appropriate. If one can find clusters of
risk, then one can adopt a targeted approach.
Rose adopts (though doesn’t argue directly) for a holistic position well opposed
to methodological individualism. This, he says, provides the “sociological basis’
for his idea of a population-level prevention strategy ([Rose, 1992], p. 95). As
he notes, the view has noble ancestry that he traces to Durkheim. In the health
context it involves the thesis that “healthiness is a characteristic of the population
as a whole and not simply of its individual members” (ibid., p. 62). The problem
is, how to turn this from mere talk into a practical framework. How, for exam-
ple, does one measure this state if not by measuring the states of the individuals
and aggregating the results? Even in the case of Durkheim’s classic analysis of
suicide the measurement and construction of population-level properties is done
‘upwardly’ via the individual members.
The division common in the social science between methodological individu-
alism and holism arises in the field of public health, then, and can have a bearing
on practical matters. For example, if one adopts a holistic approach, then one will
focus on the population as the object of investigation, with its own properties to be
measured, intervened in, and evaluated (cf. [Weed, 2004], p. 532). If, on the other
hand, one adopts an individualistic approach, then one will focus on the individual
people in a population, and measure and intervene in their properties. This, of
course, colours the explanation one gives of the causes of health and disease. A
methodological individualist will seek to explain by drawing attention to factors
having to do with the behaviour of people; holism will look to collective factors,
or the wider social and physical environment, that drive that individual behaviour.
3.6 Scientific Foundations of Public Health
Epidemiology and Biostatistics form the scientific core of public health, the foun-
dations on which decisions and actions are made. As Detels and Breslow state,
epidemiology “is the scientific method used to describe the distribution, dynam-
ics, and determinants of disease and health in human populations” ([Detels and
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Breslow, 2005], p. 10).25 Epidemiology is the obvious choice for the scientific ba-
sis of public health: both take populations as their primary objects.26 Public health
is grounded in statistical methods. Given aggregates of measurements of health-
related properties they enable the identification of health problems (bad trends,
inequalities, etc.), which in turn allows for evidence-based promotion and inter-
vention, for informing efficient health economic policy, and assessing the impact
of interventions. Epidemiology is in the business of inferring conclusions about
the distribution of health (and disease) in a population. Part of this involves un-
covering the determinants of health and disease. To do this epidemiologists attend
to relative frequencies between various patterns (smoking and lung cancer, for ex-
ample). We can roughly view the epidemiologist as giving us a measure of public
health (or at least some components) in the sense that we are able to see how these
components are distributed over the individuals in some population (whose mem-
bers are not necessarily geographically or temporally coincident). As mentioned,
one can look at relationships between components, and their trajectories over time
and place, and form hypotheses about the connections. It is these hypotheses that
can often lead to public health action in the form of interventions (or in the form
of analytical studies).
Public health and epidemiology are, then, very tightly woven together. John
Last, in his dictionary of epidemiology, broadens the fairly standard definition
given above to include action, defining it as “the study of the distribution and
determinants of health related states or events in specified populations and the
application of this study to the control of health problems” ([Last, 1995], p. 42).
That closes the gap between public health and epidemiology making them almost
identical. It is more common, I think, to view epidemiology as a providing an
evidential basis on which public health acts and bases its decisions (concerning
the management of resources, and so on). Milton Terris makes the ‘evidential-
basis’ role particularly explicit:
1. To discover the agent, host and environmental factors which affect health, in order to provide
the scientific basis for the prevention of disease and injury and the promotion of health.
2. To determine the relative importance of causes of illness, disability, and death, in order to estab-
lish priorities for research and action.
3. To identify those sections of the population which have the greatest risk from specific causes of
ill health, in order that the indicated action may be directed appropriately.
4. To evaluate the effectiveness of health programs and services in improving the health of the
population. ([Terris, 1993], p. 142)
Put in this way, public health is nothing but applied epidemiology. However,
Sander Greenland strongly distinguishes epidemiology from public health, latch-
ing on to exactly the action-based component raised by Last:
25Note that “disease” here is an umbrella term covering all manner of health-related events or phe-
nomena: HIV, smoking, teenage pregnancy, bullying, and so on. In fact, it needn’t be a negative event:
one might be interested in what is causing some positive trend, such as an increase in exercise amongst
young people.
26A lovely little book (just 69 pages) that introduces the essentials of epidemiology for the ‘uniniti-
ated’ is [Coggon et al., 1997].
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[P]ublic health is not a science, but a form of social activism, one whose benefits appear profound
enough to society that it is institutionalized and heavily subsidized by governments. A public health
activist promoting or searching for an action will be concerned with communicating, his or her own
opinions, evaluating the opinions of colleagues, and influencing the opinions of governmental figures
and the public. ([Greenland, 1988], p. 96)
Epidemiology, by contrast, is seen as unbiased, objective, and unfettered by any
kind of social incursion—thus following Weber’s dictum that “it is the duty of
the man of science to remain silent ... on value questions” ([Weber, 1920], p.
188). However, this is a rather naive view of how science works, as countless
philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have demonstrated, whether
through feministic challenges, Kuhnian challenges, or many others. Epidemiology,
more so than many other sciences (given its statistical basis), is very much invested
with values. Indeed, if we are persuaded by Donald MacKenzie [1981] arguments,
even the mathematical foundations of epidemiology are infiltrated with ‘interests’
due to their incursion into the foundations of modern statistical theory.
4
HEALTH MEASUREMENT AND HEALTH MEASURES
Health scientists and professionals want to be able to measure health for a variety
of reasons: to track changes in health, to identify problems, to identify causes and
risk factors, to check how an intervention has performed, and to perform cross-
comparisons between groups. To do this we need to have a clear idea of what we
are measuring.
4.1 Measurement and Standardization
Measurement is, as Grigory Barenblatt succinctly puts it, “the direct or indirect
comparison of a certain quantity with an appropriate standard, or, to put it another
way, with an appropriate unit of measurement” ([Barenblatt, 2003], p. 12). If we
are talking about measuring the health of the public this must involve comparison
with a standard too: a ‘unit of health’. It is clear that this is not going to be a
fundamental unit; rather, it will be a complex derived (by aggregation) from other,
more fundamental units. However, it is still a problem to say what this thing to
be measured is. The method of definition in the context of public health is to give
an operational definition. In order to ensure objectivity (or as near to objectivity
as possible) the focus is on the individual, and the wider social context is ignored:
health is viewed as what something that happens under the skin. Even the health
of populations is to be reduced to the functioning of individual bodies (a form
of methodological individualism in the context of the health sciences). That is,
ill health (at least according to most measures) is taken to be the reduction in
individual human function caused by disability or, alternatively, a reduction in the
well-being of individuals.
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This a natural position to adopt: one demands standardization in measurement.
The environment (be it physical or social) varies considerably, so it is desirable
to have a measure that does not take account of that, or that is ‘insensitive’ to
it. This is clearly especially vital if one wishes to conduct comparative work on
different populations, to measure health inequalities for example. However, this
standardization misses out on the crucial role played by context (see [Allotey et
al., 2003]): a broken leg in Canada is a fairly trivial matter, and one expects the
health discounting to be minimal. However, a broken leg in a developing country
is a far more significant matter: there may be no sickness benefit to draw from, no
easily accessible health care services, and so on. In this case the impact ought to
involve a weightier discounting. Yet we are dealing with the same event, from the
point of view of the measure: a broken leg. The individualistic health measure will
treat the cases as the same in terms of their value.
One can come up with more examples that do not involve inter-population com-
parisons. Consider two individuals from the same population, both with a sprained
finger, one of whom is a concert pianist, the other is, say, a teacher. Clearly these
individuals will weight the severity in different ways. Severity is not an objective
fact of the matter, it depends very much on the individual. Clearly then, one’s
health measures have to take account of more than the local considerations of indi-
vidual bodies. However, the determination to restrict health to individuals resulted
in the WHO introducing an idealized “uniform environment”, and then considering
(in the population health case) the “capacities” of individuals within this environ-
ment. Health is then defined as having the capacity to perform certain tasks within
an idealized (though not necessarily non-actual) environment. In other words, the
environment is introduced into the definition of health, but it itself is standardized.
The idea is to switch off the role played by the environment. We return to the
problems with such measures in §4.4, before we get to that let us first say some
more about the health measures.
4.2 Summary Measures of Health
Health measures aim to give a numerical representation of health, be it in an in-
dividual or in a population. A summary measure of health will summarize the
health states of the individuals in a population. Health status indicators (those fea-
tures that might go into a health measure) come in various kinds, and can refer to
individual or population properties, and such things as waiting times, resources-
to-demand, and so on. Aggregate measures might take a number of these and
average over them to produce an index akin to the Dow Jones Industrial Average
[DJIA].27 Amongst other things, these measures are used to assess the impact of
27For those not acquainted with the basics of financial markets, the DJIA is an index composed of
thirty blue chip stocks. Initially, the value was computed by simply adding together all of the company
stock prices and dividing by 30. The number is is then taken to provide a (fairly rough) measure of the
economy’s state—it is sometimes said to provide a measure of the economy’s health! There are many
such indices one can use, largely depending upon one’s interests.
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interventions and policy. Though a little dated, [Bergner, 1985] gives an excellent
overview of the measurement of health status.
In public health, then, (or population health, more generally) one does not (thus
far) measure a property of some system ‘the public’. Rather, one measures prop-
erties of individuals and then aggregates the data that results. One is then left with
a single number, a statistic, that is intended to provide the requisite (‘summary’)
measure of the larger system. This can be understood in terms of ‘social indica-
tors’, i.e. statistics that are intended to be calibrated to the quality of life of the
individuals who’s relevant properties are aggregated in some way (cf. [Micha-
los, 2006], p. 344). Vital statistics would be an example of social indicators, as
would the various financial indices. They would be examples of objective indic-
tors since they rely on facts that are independent of ‘internal’ states of individu-
als28—whether they are ‘value-free’ is another matter, one that we return to below.
Quality of life indicators might refer to the subjective reports of individuals, such
as degree of happiness, and in this case they are subjective indicators. As we saw,
the job of representing (or indicating) the overall health state of a population was,
from very early on, filled by mortality rates. However, this misses a major com-
ponent: morbidity. Summary measures of population health were devised in the
1960s to take account of both mortality and morbidity.
One unit for measuring health (and so the effectiveness of an interventions)
via the notion of quality of life, is the ‘quality-adjusted life year’ [QALY]. This
gives a measure of the quality and quantity of life.29 These depart from the more
objective measure in terms of life expectancy (alive = 1 or dead = 0) by introducing
a continuum of states between 0 and 1, where the value 1 is taken to represent
‘perfect health’ and 0 still represents death. More precisely, the value 1 is assigned
to one year of perfect health-life expectancy. If a year contains less than perfect
health-life expectancy, then a value of less than 1 is assigned. Computations are
then very straightforward. For example, if we intervene to extend a patients life by
5 years, but the quality of life for those 5 years is half of the perfect quality, then
we simply compute the QALYs gained in the intervention as 5 × 0.5. Hence, 2.5
QALYs will have been generated by the intervention. Such medical mathematics
informs medical decisions, since one can use the values so computed to work out
which interventions will have the greatest ‘yield’ in terms of QALYs.
In [Murray et al., 2000] a distinction is made between ‘ideal’ and ‘actual’
health. “Ideal” has two senses here: it signifies the health state we want indi-
viduals to attain (namely a full life at full health: with full defined appropriately);
and it also serves as kind of limiting case of real health. It is ideal in that it doesn’t
exist in reality, but only as a concept, or perhaps in some other possible world.
An aggregate (or summary) population measure can be constructed from measure-
ments of individuals’ by simply adding all of the differences between the ideal and
actual health of individuals. This gives the years of life lost in a population [YLL]
28See [Stouman and Falk, 1937] for a thorough, early review of objective indices of health.
29The on-line resource Bandolier refers to the QALY as “a slightly mythical creature of dubious
parentage” (http://www.jr2.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/band24/b24-7.html).
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and can be used to measure the level of disease. The way of calculating a figure is
fairly straightforward in practice, if not philosophically. Given a specified ‘ideal’
age (80 for males; 80.2 for females), the YLL is the difference between the ac-
tual life and the ideal age. Each subsequent year is weighted slightly less than the
previous year. This way of speaking (i.e. of ‘ideal’ states) fits in with the WHO’s
definition of health as “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being
and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity”. Naturally this is a limiting
case: no individual, I presume, could ever hope to attain such a state.
One can also consider a measure involving morbidity the years lost due to dis-
ability (with mortality as a limiting case). In this case one reduces the value as-
signed to each year for which the individual was disabled (with an ordering of
severities of disability corresponding to an ordering of the amount of the reduc-
tion). Population health is then the sum of the years lost to premature mortality
and to morbidity. For a given population of individuals (including those who are
recently deceased), when we sum this figure for all events during a single year then
we get the measure known as the DALY: the Disability Adjusted Life Year. One
DALY represents the loss of one year’s worth of healthy life. The DALY again in-
volves an ideal reference population with life expectancy (at birth) as above. The
burden of disease is then computed as the difference between this ideal state and
the state of a populations health (recorded in DALYs).30
There are numerous problems with these measures, largely stemming from the
lack of an objectively-agreed upon weighting of events. For example, there might
well be states of life in which the suffering involved is worse than death. The
measures that are constructed are clearly not carving social reality at the joints (al-
though they may serve to define those joints arbitrarily, or rather, by convention).
The DALY is most decidedly not a natural kind.31
4.3 Classifying and Measuring Health States
Summary measures of population health perform multiple useful roles: they can
enable the cross-time or cross-pace comparison of health state; they can identify
problems, and they can tell us if an intervention worked. Dennis Fryback ([1998],
p. 43) notes that there are three steps involved in the construction of health mea-
sures:
1. decide on the aspects of health that will be included in the (discrete) classi-
fication scheme
2. construct a mapping between the health of humans and the states in the
30Note that QALYs are a subclass of the more general measures known as HALYs (‘health-adjusted
life years’). A nice review of these issues can be found in [Reidpath, 2007]. A compendious volume
dealing with a host of issues relating to population health measures is [Murray et al., 2002b].
31Of course, ethical issues loom large; however, I want to steer clear from these in this chapter. For
an excellent review of the moral implications of summary measures, see [Brock, 1998].
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classification scheme32
3. assign weights to each health state included in the classification to be used
to compute population health
The classification scheme is clearly going to involve massive abstraction from
‘real’ human health states. How much abstraction will be determined by the use
to which the measure is put. The earliest measures simply classified health ac-
cording to two values, ‘alive’ and ‘dead’. This measure will be adequate for any
task that requires only mortality rate data. A finer measure will need to differenti-
ate various sub-states within ‘alive’—clearly ‘dead’ has no relevant fine structure.
Again, the amount of differentiation will be a choice determined by the level of
detail one needs for the use.33 If one wants to know the best way to deliver some
mental health intervention, then one will demand a measure that takes account of
this. Health, in other words, is multi-dimensional. There are different perspectives
that one can adopt towards the health of a system. Given this pragmatic way of
conceptualizing health, I don’t see that it makes much sense to try to adopt a sin-
gle definition, as is the trend in philosophical discussions. Biological disfunction,
for example, is but one aspect of health. In some cases it might be an appropriate
definition or measure of health, in others it will not be. A genuinely naturalistic
approach to the question of what health is ought to follow what our best science
has to say on the matter, and it appears that this pragmatic multifaceted approach
is the answer given by that science.34
One can usefully view this situation through the lens of Giere’s scientific per-
spectivism. The idea is to view the various measures as so many scientific instru-
ments restricted to ‘viewing’ only certain aspects of the systems they are directed
at. Here too, I think, “one’s theoretical perspective ... depends on the kind of
problem one faces”. Different problems demand different perspectives.
The old problems, however, do set in when it comes to weighting the various
health states separated by the classification system. There is no objective way
of doing this, and an infinite variety is clearly possible. But I think it is best to
run the same argument just given: how one assigns health state weights depends
on what problem one has in mind. For example, if one is concerned with the
32Given that the classification system results in a measurement system, we then get an operational-
ization of our health concept.
33For example, the (summary) health measure known as ‘HUI-Mark III’ (where ‘HUI’ = ‘Health
Utility Index’) has the ability to distinguish between 972,000 distinct health states pertaining to the
physical, mental and social dimensions of health. For many purposes this amount of complexity would
be simply unnecessary.
34Sander Greenland [2002] argues that health’s multidimensional nature ought to be reflected in
the scrapping of scalar measures in favour of multidimensional measures (vectors whose components
represent the different aspects of health). Hausman [2002] argues that while there might be some
theoretical attractiveness to this proposal, it is not practical and would most likely be ignored by health
policy makers. That is probably correct, however, such a measure would have many uses not covered
by unidimensional measures. Unless we wish to fall under the philosopher’s spell of the one unique
measure that best represents the true health state, then we ought to accept these measures as providing
a perfectly acceptable additional perspective on the health state of a population.
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‘productivity’ of the population, then physical disabilities will presumably be more
heavily weighted than self-esteem, say. If one wants a measure that will appear the
most democratic, then one might wish to base the weightings on average values
assigned to various health states as taken from a survey. The QALY discussed
above is based on cost-effectiveness issues and so naturally it bases health state
weights on utility. If one is happy to say that there is a plurality of health systems
(i.e. that there is no classification system that is the most objectively true) then the
values that inevitably go into the weightings do not cause the kinds of problems
they cause for other so-called naturalistic accounts: one is not privileging one
system as ‘fact’ in the first place.
4.4 The Inadequacy of Aggregative Measures
As we have seen, aggregate measures are based on the view that the health of
a system is determined solely by the health of its individual parts; if one knows
the latter then one knows the former. Daniel Reidpath [2005] argues that aggre-
gate measures of public health are inadequate on the grounds that the aggregate
does not provide any information on how health is spread out over the population.
To work this out one needs to look at the shape of the probability distribution of
health states over the individuals. Presumably we would consider a population in
which 5 % of the population have enormously high health values (relative to some
measure, life expectancy, say) and the remaining 95 % have relatively poor health
(giving a very skewed, fat-tailed distribution) to warrant a lower health value than
one in which there is a relatively high and even (or normal) distribution of health.
However, one can construct all manner of distributions of health of a population
of individuals many of which will be grossly iniquitous, yet that correspond to one
and the same aggregate value, on account of possessing the same average. That
is to say, the value assigned to a summary measure of health is multiply realiz-
able by (infinitely) many ‘spreadings’ of health and disease over the population,
(infinitely) many of which are grossly iniquitous. An individual asked to choose
which of the populations they would like to belong to would not be indifferent,
therefore, argues Reidpath, the distribution is relevant to the way we go about
measuring the health of a population.
Take a simple toy example. Suppose we have two populations with the same
number of people in each. Suppose that we aggregate the health of the individuals
and come up with figures of 100 QALYs as the aggregate measure in both cases.
Now, if we were to use this to determine which population were healthier would
would have to say that they were equal. The measure is not sensitive enough to
detect finer details. However, the finer details are all important. In one popula-
tion 80% of the QALYs might be generated by 20% of the people (so that most
people are very unhealthy), whereas in the other population the situation is more
balanced, with, say, 80% of the QALYs generated by 80% of the people. Rather
more visually, we might consider two populations, one of which were composed
of two types of human, giants and dwarfs, and the other with a broader range of
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heights. We could set this up so that the average heights of the populations were
identical, and yet the average figure is not giving us the kind of information we
want from a measure of, say, what the sizes of the people are like in the respective
populations.
The problem, then, is to do with the aggregative methodology which involves
simply taking the individual level data and summarizing it. The methodology is
individualistic: population-level phenomena are seen as nothing but the synthesis
of individual-level data. The business of the distribution of health and disease is
then seen as a quite separate issue. Reasons given, for this separability of level of
health and distribution of health, by those who construct the measures range from
‘tradition’ (i.e. the health statistics tradition stemming from mortality rates—see
[Murray et al., 2002a], p. 752) to ‘communicability’ (in the sense that it is easily
assimilated by the general public—ibid.).
Reidpath argues that this is the wrong way to conceptualize health at the popu-
lation level. He does not suggest a holistic approach as such, but instead one based
on development economics, that blends population level data about the distribution
of health (or, rather, well-being) with the individual level data. That is, the distri-
bution of socially relevant properties over the individuals in populations should not
be separated from the measurement of that property at the population level. The
implication of this seems to be that aggregate measures miss out on ‘emergent’
features of population health. As Redipath puts it, “there is information relevant to
the health of a population that can only be derived from the gestalt that cannot be
ascertained from the sum of its parts” ([Reidpath, 2005], p. 879). More is different
in population health, we might say (here following [Anderson, 1972]).
Reidpath is certainly right that the summary measures are not sufficient for
many purposes. However, clearly sufficiency depends on the task to which the
measure is being put. Sometimes a more coarse-grained measure of health might
be all that is needed. Other times, this will be inadequate and the fine structure of a
population’s health will need to be incorporated. That is, one cannot, as Reidpath
does, speak of insufficiency simpliciter; insufficiency is tied to a specific goal.
4.5 Cross-Comparison of Heath Categories and the Ranking of
Health States
Daniel Hausman draws attention to a problem of the cross-comparison of what
appear to be incommensurable categories of health state. He presents the example
of comparing an individual with a mild learning disability to an individual with
quadriplegia. How is this comparison to be made? As Hausmann puts it: “How
can one compare units of mobility with units of cognitive functioning? How can
one measure the ‘distance’ of health states from H [complete health]?” ([2006], p.
251). As he points out, the usual way of comparing is via evaluation. One makes
a value judgement about which would be better or worse. Hausman sees no way
past this state of affairs: “Measurements of population health are measures of how
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good or bad population health is, and the goodness or badness of health depends
on the physical, technological, and social environment and on the characteristics of
people’s activities and objectives as much as they depend on facts about stomachs
or brains” (ibid., p. 252). Indeed, the DALY, and many other health measures,
involve a ranking of disabilities according to the impact on functional capacity (the
capacity to do certain things, like walking a certain distance). That this weighting
is explicit is touted as an advantage over QALYs since the value judgements are
open to view and modification—see [Murray, 1994].
John Broome argues that the ranking of health states is done according to how
the state contributes “to well-being” ([2002], p. 94). Well-being is a bad basis
for the evaluation of health states since it is too vague. Hausman argues, instead,
that the ranking is, in practice, done according to preference (ibid., p. 253). This
is a “faulty” method on account of problems (false beliefs and cognitive deficien-
cies) with preference (ibid., p. 264). Preferences are the outcome of some other
reasoning processes: these, Hausman argues, ought to be investigated by those
concerned with the evaluation of health states. This all points to the fact that mea-
suring and comparing health states is a difficult enterprise, not just technically and
conceptually, but also morally.
5
HEALTH INEQUALITIES
Health inequalities refer to differences in health state between units, or the varia-
tion in a population of subunits. A large part of public health is devoted to reducing
such inequalities. Many of the same problems faced with measuring health per se
can be found in the context of measuring health inequalities. The WHO’s measures
use a variation on the Gini coefficient (an index used to measure wealth inequali-
ties) in which the health of every individual in a population is compared to every
other from the same population:






Here, the parameters α and β control the contribution of the absolute difference
pairs of individuals and the weight of the mean respectively. The individuals i
and j can be people, social groups, or entire populations, as appropriate, and yk
represents a health measurement outcome performed on individual k—the health
measure can take a variety of forms, as discussed previously. The term µ repre-
sents the average health (or expected health, relative to some measure) of the entire
population (or, given very large n, some well-chosen sample). The value is pro-
portional to the difference between the (area under the) perfect equality curve E
and the (area under the) Lorenz curve L: G = 1− ALAE . A value G = 0 represents
a situation with perfect equality and the value G = 1 represents perfect inequality.
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Inequality, formally, concerns the distribution of a property over a population of
individual units or between populations. What measure one chooses will to a large
extent depend on the units in question. Individual people, cities, social groups,
gender, countries, etc... So the health measure will be guided by context: if one
wishes to compare countries, and search for inequalities at this level, then one
might use an index built by averaging over a bunch of health related properties. In
this case one is treating the countries as individuals with their own properties. One
is then concerned with the distribution of the values of this property over a domain
of countries. Hausman et al. point out that focusing on “contrasts between social
groups ... hides inequalities within groups” ([Hausman et al., 2002], p. 184). The
point here is that one could have a pair of countries with the same value relative to
our chosen measure, but have radically different distributions of individual health
within the population.35 (We have been here before, of course: this is essentially
the same objection raised by Reidpath in §4.4.) Writing on the subject of economic
inequalities, Charles Wheelan writes: “If the pie is growing, how much should we
care about the size of the pieces?” ([Wheelan, 2003], p. 115). In other words,
if the economy is steadily growing, so that everyone is becoming ‘better off’ in
an absolute sense, then does it matter that the spread between rich and poor is
simultaneously increasing? There are many things one can say about this: one
might argue that the reason the economy is growing steadily is precisely because
of those at the top earning more: they are the companies and individuals who are
investing more, in research, technology, and enterprise. On the other hand, you
could argue that the more people there are earning more pushes prices of items up
that lie out of the range of those poorer people, thus making the inequalities even
more extreme. Either way, the challenge of Reidpath and Hausman et al. needs to
be answered.
Beyond these issues of distribution, the key philosophical problems with the
research on health inequalities are to do with the level of support the data give
to the possible explanations of the inequalities. There seems to be some genuine
underdetermination going on. This seems to be what underlies virtually all of the
objections raised by Forbes and Wainwright [2001] in their philosophical investi-
gation of health inequality explanations: the data does not uniquely determine one
explanation. Nor, they imply, can one give, on methodological grounds, an infer-
ence to the best explanation. Forbes and Wainwright further contend that a latent
positivism underlies much of the health inequality literature. They argue that the
extant explanations of health inequalities are too data-dependent. They claim to
argue for a ‘realist’ position in [Wainwright and Forbes, 2000]; however, the fact
that they deny the links between the mathematical representations used by health
scientists and the reality it is supposed to be representing does not appear to match
any of the standard brands of scientific realism. They seem to confuse realism
35Here they are following the analysis of Murray et al. [1999] according to which “health inequality
should be defined in terms of inequality across individuals” (p. 541). I say we should take ‘individual’
as applying to people, groups, and populations in general according to ones interests and goals—this
seems to be implied in the way the WHO measure is constructed.
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with a belief in unobservables that have no observable effect whatsoever, direct or
indirect. Of course, realist positions are committed to the reality of unobservables,
however, they will only be committed to such things when they generate some
kinds of effect or are necessary to explain some observable phenomenon. Com-
pletely detaching from data is a dangerous position to espouse in any science, let
alone in health research. For this reason, philosophers would do well to scrutinize
these arguments.
6
HEALTH MEASURES AND NATURAL KINDS
In his classic discussion of the problem of defining health and disease Lester King
wrote that “Science, in studying relations within the total environment, cares not a
whit about ‘health”’ ([1954], p. 193). What he meant by this is that the data alone
do not represent a state of disease until we have given it that interpretation:
Disease is the aggregate of those conditions which, judged by the prevailing culture, are deemed
painful, or disabling, and which, at the same time, deviate from either the statistical norm or from
some idealized status. Health, the opposite, is the state of well-being conforming to the ideals of the
prevailing culture, or to the statistical norm. The ideal itself is derived in part from the statistical norm,
and in part from the ab-normal which seems particularly desirable. ([King, 1954], p. 197)
The problem of how to measure health (or disease) is intimately connected with
what we take health (or disease) to be. Even if we can agree on the definition of
individual health, it is a further difficulty to figure out how to aggregate health to
get a handle on the health of a population. Furthermore, the debate between nor-
mativists and naturalists reasserts itself at this level. Naturalists will claim that the
aggregate measures satisfy value-free construction methods, whereas normativists
will disagree. An important and interesting question for philosophers to tackle
would be to investigate the links between one’s position with respect to individ-
ual health and disease and health and disease and the aggregate level. Intuitively
one would expect that if one adopts the position that the definition of health and
disease at the individual level is value-laden then this would be transmitted to the
aggregate definition. However, given the fact that the measures involve weightings
of specific diseases and disabilities, one might expect that the transmission must
fail. The weightings and measures, as I argued above, are not themselves stalking
out natural kinds, they are bound to the use to which they will be put.
Daniel Sulmasy [2005] argues, in any case, that disease itself is not a natural
kind, but that it involves reference to natural kinds. Humans, for example, are
natural kinds and disease “is a classification of a certain state of affairs that can
occur in members” of this kind (p. 496). Although Sulmasy argues that one must
refer to multiple individuals in order to infer that some phenomenon (some illness)
is a disease, the account is nonetheless an individuals-based account. It is not easy
to see how this could be extended to public health. The only way I can see how it
would be possible would be to argue that certain populations are natural kinds, and
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then one might identify certain patterns than arise repeatedly in such populations
as diseases.
Beyond this, it has been argued that population-level features can have a direct
bearing on the way we conceive of these notions:
Characteristics of populations also influence our very definitions of what is health and what is disease.
Rose notes that what we consider normal is influenced by what is prevalent. ‘What is common is all
right, we presume.’ One implication of this is that social facts may also influence disease incidence
in the broadest sense, by determining what we consider to be a disease. Social facts influence our
expectations of how many aches and pains are normal, how long we expect to live and what we expect
our bodies to look like and our minds to accomplish. Bodily aberrations and biological variants can
come to be defined as diseases or redefined as normal. Obesity, intersexed conditions, senility, acne,
post-traumatic stress and gender identity disorder are just a few examples. ([Schwartz and Diez-Roux,
2001], p. 439).
In other words, since values are linked to the population, we cannot escape con-
siderations of population in the debate over the nature and definition of health and
disease.
I have been hinting at a pragmatic response to the debate in much of the pre-
ceding discussion. This would involve a rejection of the distinction between facts
and values on which the debate rests. An earlier attempt at a pragmatic definition
was made by Fanshel [1972]. However, his approach puts the pressure on the no-
tion of functional states (and dysfunctional states) and then weights these, using a
notion of ideal function (thus bringing in the debate once again). The philosophi-
cal debate over the ontological status of disease and health involves the extremes
of realism and relativism. I think the work on population measures of health and
disease suggests a pluralistic approach that avoids the excesses of these extremes.
The approach is well-stated by Giere (here in the context of modeling water):
consider the simple case of water. If one is studying diffusion or Brownian motion, one adopts a
molecular perspective in which water is regarded as a collection of particles. But the situation is far
too complex to adopt a Newtonian perspective for individual particles. Instead, one adopts a statistical
perspective in which the primary variables are things like mean free path (the average distance a particle
travels between collisions). However, if ones concern is the behavior of water flowing through pipes,
the best fitting models are generated within a perspective that models water as a continuous fluid. Thus,
ones theoretical perspective on the nature of water depends on the kind of problem one faces. Here
employing a plurality of perspectives has a solid pragmatic justification. There are different problems
to be solved and neither perspective by itself provides adequate resources for solving all the problems.
([Giere, 2006], pp. 33–34)
There are multifarious uses to which health measures are put: cross comparison of
health, determination of healthcare expenditure, targeting of interventions, etc. I
advocate a transferal, of this way of thinking about health measures, to the philo-
sophical problem of understanding what health and disease are. There no reason
to think that the measure used in each case need be the same in all cases. To think
this would be to suppose that there is some ‘One True Health State’ in the world
that these measures are trying to latch on to.
7
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CAUSALITY IN PUBLIC HEALTH
Public health, even more so than medicine, is fundamentally concerned with find-
ing the causes of those phenomena that cause disease and impact on health.36 Such
phenomena can be singular or general. That is, one might wish to ascertain the
cause of a particular outbreak of SARs or one might want to understand the gen-
eral mechanism by which SARs outbreaks occur and propagate themselves. The
population-level focus alters the causation debate’s compass somewhat. In the
public health context, as Maxwell Parkin and Bray put it:
“Cause” is a relative concept, that only has meaning [in] terms of its removal being associated with
diminished risk of the disease, and, in this context, it is just as relevant to improve educational levels in
a population as a means of reducing infection by HIV as it is to identify the mechanisms by which the
virus enters the host cell. ([Maxwell Parkin and Bray, 2005], pp. 158–9)
Nancy Cartwright makes a similar point, stating that “although causes may not
be universally conjoined with their effects, at least they should increase their fre-
quency” ([Cartwright, 1989], p. 55). This is, of course, the hallmark of a proba-
bilistic conception of causality. The approach to causation in the context of health
intervention research is certainly probabilistic (or statistical): one often works
‘backwards’ from data, containing patterns of association between variables over
a sample (e.g. joint distributions), to causes. As Holland explains, the emphasis in
statistical models of causation is on “measuring the effects of causes” rather than
“the causes of effects” ([Holland, 1986], p. 945 - emphasis in original).
However, as Judea Pearl points out, the data isn’t sufficient, by itself, to permit
causal inferences:
There is nothing in the joint distribution of symptoms and diseases to tell us that curing the former
would or would not cure the latter. [Moreover,] there is nothing in a distribution function to tell us how
that distribution would differ if external conditions were to change ... because the laws of probability
theory do not dictate how one property of a distribution ought to change when another property is
modified. ([Pearl, 2001], p.191)
It is clearly crucial that we know the direction of an association, and how the as-
sociation would change given different background conditions: the success of in-
tervention research depends on such information. Hence, some extra piece needs
to be added to the puzzle in order to allow for the extraction of valid causal in-
ferences from mere statistical data. In The Oxford Dictionary of Statistical Terms
‘causality’ is defined as follows:
Philosophically difficult notion of relation between an explanatory variable and a response. Older
discussions were non-statistical and involved some notion of necessary and sufficient condition for
the response. There are a number of variants of a statistical definition of causality (Holland, 1986
[“Statistics and Causal Inference”, Journal of the American Statistical Association 81: pp. 945-960]).
In one the cause must be in some sense prior to the response and alternative allowable explanations of
the statistical independence involved must be excluded. In another there is a notion that the possible
cause can conceptually be manipulated with a consequent systematic effect on the response. ([Dodge,
2003], p. 59)
36I say ‘even more so than medicine’ because medicine is generally more concerned with treatment
than prevention.
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The latter aspect, pertaining to manipulability, has formed the basis of many con-
temporary accounts of causation, philosophical and otherwise and gives us the
“extra piece” alluded to above. For example, Woodward and Hausmann write:
[M]anipulation is crucial to our conception of causation and to the contrast between causation and
mere correlation. When X and Y are correlated and X does not cause Y , one expects that when one
manipulatesX , the correlation will break down. By contrast, ifX causes Y , one expects that for some
range of values of X , if one is able to manipulate those values, one can thereby control the value of Y .
([Hausman and Woodward, 2004], p. 847)
Following Glymour and his team, Woodward and Hausmann understand interven-
tions as processes that (directly) manipulate some variable (the response variable)
so as to ‘detach’ the manipulated variable from its other causes (i.e. its ‘parents’)—
i.e. the response variable is rendered probabilistically independent of any other
causes. This condition they call ‘modularity’, and, along with its close relative the
‘causal Markov condition’, it has been the subject of much recent controversy (pri-
marily having to do with whether real systems of interest are themselves modular).
This manipulationist account is not new, however. In their popular epidemiol-
ogy textbook, MacMahon and Pugh define a causal association as one in which
“an alteration in the frequency or quality of one category is followed by a change
in the other” ([MacMahon and Pugh, 1970], pp. 17-8; cited in [Schaffner, 1991],
p. 206). Likewise, Rubin ([1986], p. 962) holds up the motto “no causation with-
out manipulation” as a “critical guideline for clear thinking in empirical studies for
causal effects”. The manipulationist account has also been central to the study of
experimental design. For example, Cook and Campbell ([1979], p. 36) write that
a “paradigmatic assertion” regarding causal relationships is that by manipulating a
cause we will manipulate the effect: “Causation implies that by varying one factor
I can make another vary”.37
In the context of public health research, at least, when causes get more indirect
or ‘distal’, they are labeled ‘risk factors’—cf. Schaffner ([1991], p. 206). In
other words, many health researchers are reluctant to use the term ‘cause’ when
the association is probabilistic. For example, Kleinbaum et al. write that:
Because of the lack of certainty in our results, epidemiologists generally use the term risk factor in-
stead of cause to indicate a variable that is believed to be related to the probability of an individual’s
developing the disease prior to the point of irreversibility. ([Kleinbaum et al., 1982], p. 29; quoted in
Schaffner [1991], p. 206)
This attitude continues to be seen in many areas of health research. In the context
of public health, however, it has transformed into the concept of a determinant.
In this wider context the determinants are often social, which greatly increases
37In his lecture “The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation”, Sir Austin Bradford
Hill considered some rules of thumb that might enable causal inference in difficult situations. Hill did
the wise thing and tried to avoid a philosophical discussion of causality. Of course, one can’t really
engage in a discussion of causality without slipping into philosophical issues. In laying out his view of
causality he too clearly defends a probabilistic, manipulationist account. This can be clearly discerned
in his claim that the decisive question in causality research is “whether the frequency of the undesirable
event B would be influenced by a change in the environmental feature A”.
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the complexity of issues to do with causality, and prima facie decreases the appli-
cability of the manipulationist account. Public health focuses primarily on these
social determinants of health, and, inasmuch as manipulability is involved at all,
the approach to interventions that it underwrites is one that seeks to manipulate the
very fabric of society; that is, to shift the patterns of disease and their distributions
in the population as a whole. Often, however, direct manipulation (i.e. control)
is not possible, and so one has to resort to observational studies. Furthermore, as
Weed points out, manipulability misses out on certain important factors that can-
not be controlled: gender and ethnicity. These are called ‘categorical properties’ in
the literature of statistical theories of causality. In fact I think when merged with
the counterfactual account we can make good sense of manipulating categorical
properties too. That is, we can imagine (or give state descriptions of) worlds in
which gender is swapped, and so on. Even in the case where one can manipulate,
the evidence that it was one’s manipulations that caused some outcome, and not
some other factor, is not easy to assess because of the complexity of the systems
involved. Understanding this latter aspect is the task of ‘evaluation’. A very se-
rious problem with evaluation in this context is just such ‘fat hand’ intervention
features—see [Scheines, 2005] for more on fat hand interventions.
There is an old debate, as we have seen, over whether a social or biomedical
(natural) cause is responsible for some disease. Causation in public health looks
at the determinants of disease and health at the level of the population. The inci-
dence of disease in a population is given by the averaging out of individual cases
over the population. However, in doing this we can see patterns that can point
to causes for the incidence of disease than cannot be gleaned from measuring the
individual cases themselves. Social epidemiologists often use this to argue that the
biomedical model of disease causation ought to be replaced by a socio-medicial
one involving what they call “upstream” or “distal” causes. That is, if we want
to have causal explanations of disease, then the place to look for the fundamental
causes is not at the level of local biological phenomena but at the level society
and the social networks in which individuals find themselves because it is only
there that manipulation will lead to elimination of the mechanisms that lead to
disease—see, for example, Link and Phelan [1995].
Michael Root moves this debate into an interesting direction, linking it up with
the issue of natural and artificial kinds and classifications that we discussed earlier.
Root notes that there are clear disparities in the health states of black and white
people: “blacks are seven times more likely to die of tuberculosis than whites, three
times more likely to die of H.I.V.-A.I.D.S and twice as likely to die of diabetes”
([Root, 2000], p. S629). The diseases themselves, Root argues, are biological
while the racial differences are social; and yet a social factor here appears to be
determining biological factors: racial factors appear to be resulting in differences
in the rates of disease. A possible sociological explanation, then, for the health
inequalities between blacks and white suggests itself: it is known that high stress
levels can suppress the immune system, and being black is stressful (at least in
the U.S.). This is an explanation of disease distribution, and health inequality, that
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is broadly in line with those given by social epidemiologists. The idea is that it
is social factors, rather than biological factors or mechanisms, that are ultimately
responsible for the distribution of disease (despite the fact that some biological
explanation can be given for the disease occurrence in some individual). However,
Root assumes that the explanation is the correct one without argument or evidence,
relying on plausibility alone.
Albert Mosley attempts to deflate the ‘biomedical versus social’ debate by draw-
ing attention to the distinction between the distribution of disease in a population
and the occurrence of disease in an individual. He argues—in the context of the
debate over whether HIV or poverty causes AIDS—that the answer one gives “is
relative to whether the inquirer is interested in the disease or the epidemic, with a
focus on individuals or populations” ([2004], p. 412). In other words, in a sense
both cause AIDS, but the notion of ‘cause’ and the notion of the disease are dif-
ferent in each case: “HIV and poverty are different kinds of causes that operate
on different levels of inquiry” (p. 413). This approach is more or less equivalent
to that of Stallones who argues that we should understand causation of health and
disease in “two modes”, both in terms of the production of illness in individuals
and in terms of the generation of patterns illness in populations ([1980], p. 73).38
I think this kind of pluralism offers a good way to cut through some of the dense
and seemingly interminable debate over social or biological causation. However,
though I think the distinction is needed, it leaves us no better off in terms of our
understanding of causation at either the individual or the population level.
8
STUDY DESIGN AND EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE
Study designs are intended to get the best evidence for a given context, with the
ultimate hope of enabling good causal inferences to be made (or at least to sug-
gest causal hypotheses).39 That is, one designs a study to investigate correlations
between variables (‘exposure variables’ on the one hand, and variables associated
with disease on the other). There are two broad categories of study: ‘experimental’
and ‘observational’.
Experimental Studies. Experimental studies or ‘intervention trials’ involve the
active intervention into the system of interest; this is often compared with a
38Note, however, that Russo et al. [2006] argue that the fact that one speaks about “two levels of
causation” does not thereby commit one to saying that causation acts differently at these two levels.
Russo and Williamson argue that while causal monism is false, causal pluralism is not right either,
since it involves a conflation “the evidence from which causal relations are drawn with the very notion
of cause” ([2007], p. 169). In this case, however, it is clear that evidence is not at issue: it is the level
at which causality is being considered.
39Weed identifies as his “keystone” issue for a philosophy of public health the question: “What
justifies the decision to implement a preventative intervention, to move, in other words, from scientific
evidence to public health action?” ([Weed, 2004], p. 531). This is essentially a policy issue: how does
evidence get translated into a concrete result?
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control which does not receive an intervention (but may receive a placebo).
The reasoning is that if the incidence of some disease is reduced following
the intervention (or if there is a difference between the intervention and con-
trol groups) then, adopting probabilistic causal reasoning, there is a causal
relationship between the intervention and the outcome of interest.
The most superior form of intervention is the RCT in which the treatment
allocation is randomized. In public health these will most often take the
form of ‘preventative trials’ (the most prevalent of which is the population
or group-level community intervention trial). Of course, given the nature
of many of the hypotheses relevant in public health (involving the gender or
race of individuals, or involving children, for example), experimental studies
are rare.40
Observational Studies. An observational study is broadly descriptive, aiming to
find out how health and disease are distributed over a population. The data
can often reveal correlations between variables which can in turn point the
way to testing of causal hypotheses (either statistically or experimentally).
Observational studies split into two broad types: descriptive and analytic.
1. Descriptive Studies:
• Cross-Sectional Studies: ‘Health Statics’. Cross-sectional stud-
ies (otherwise known as cross-sectional field surveys) are descrip-
tive studies intended to give an instantaneous picture (or a ‘thin-
sandwich’ picture) of some system (specifically of the prevalence
of disease) by investigating survey data for the members of the
population of interest. Though the study is considered too weak
(for making causal inferences) by modern standards, it can lead to
the development of such hypotheses. Note that it also led to both
the development of both case-control and cohort designs (qua re-
peated cross-sectional surveys)—cf. [Susser, 1985], pp. 28–31.
• Ecological Study. An ecological study is a descriptive study tak-
ing populations as it’s units of analysis. It looks for correlations
at the population level that might pave the way to more detailed
causal investigations.
2. Analytic Studies:
40The units of intervention in public health contexts are often, as mentioned, higher-level entities,
such as schools, hospitals, and other large groups of individuals (including entire communities in the
case of community intervention trials). It is clear that if it is needed at the level of individual people
randomization is also needed at this level too, for confounding will be just as possible here. For
example, an intervention to reduce the incidence of skin cancer in a community by the application of a
new sun lotion might be confounded by a number of factors: behaviour modification resulting in less
frequent exposure to the sun (perhaps as a result of the idea of risk of skin cancer suggested by the
trial itself) and a mild summer are two possibilities. To avoid confounding at this level one randomizes
‘clusters’ of individuals—hence, this study design is known as “cluster randomization”.
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• Case-Control Studies. Case-control studies (also known as ‘ret-
rospective’ or ‘case-referent’ studies) focus on individuals who
develop a disease (the “cases” in question), after which one ex-
amines their past histories in order to seek out relevant differences
between their histories and the histories of individuals without the
disease—that is, one looks for a greater frequency in the pres-
ence of some risk factor. This method is a fairly effective way
of discovering causes of rare diseases. But it is clearly restricted
to small scale. Moreover, it is highly fallible due to the fact that
the histories most often involve the individual patient’s memory
recall.
• Longitudinal Studies: ‘Health Dynamics’. In a longitudinal study
the aim is to build up a picture of the evolution of some system
over time.41 Hence, one gathers information about the system
(usually via the sample members) at multiple times. In other
words, a longitudinal study works by piecing together the snap-
shots from cross-sectional studies. One can use such studies to
identify seasonal effects in health, and to get a firmer grip on po-
tential correlations between variables. They are the obvious tool
to assess the health impact of interventions. Longitudinal studies
also enable one to chart the history of phenomena of interest, say
the spread of a disease.
A cohort study (also called ‘follow-up’ or ‘prospective’ studies)
is the most well-known longitudinal study design, focusing on a
group (or ‘cohort’) of individuals who do not have the disease, but
in which there are both exposed and non-exposed members.42 If
there is an increase in the risk in the exposed subset then this is
taken to be indicative of a causal relationship. The major problem
with this method is that of confounding factors. In order to draw
solid causal conclusions about the exposure, the exposure must
be the sole difference between the members. Clearly this is never
the case in real-world situations. One needs to supplement the
account with some other factors.
Quasi-Experimental Studies. Quasi-experiments or ‘natural experiments’ rely
on natural variation with respect to exposure (and matching in all other rel-
evant respects) in and across populations. However, this means that there is
no experimental control in who is exposed.
41Strictly speaking, of course, longitudinal studies are not restricted to observational studies: one
could perform repeated experimental studies to determine the dynamics of a population too. However,
in practice, given the expense required, they are most often conducted observationally.
42Snow’s investigation of the cholera epidemic (discussed in §2.4) has elements of a cohort study:
Snow divided his units (households) into two groups according to their exposure to water from either
one or the other water companies. Grouped in this way the data revealed a clear connection between
the water supply and cholera mortality.
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As with clinical medicine, there is believed to be a ‘hierarchy’ of evidence, with
RCTs (randomized controlled trials) at the top—in fact, the systematic review
is seen as being at the top of the evidential hierarchy, since this synthesizes the
results from multiple RCTs. Many novel problems emerge when one considers
large-scale public health interventions. For example, there is a serious difficulty
in external validity (or generalizability from one context to another) on account of
the complexity of the environment and the problem of shielding the study from
interference effects (between groups) and attrition.
In his analysis of the (in-) efficiency of the NHS (the UK’s national health
service)—in his lecture series in 1971 entitled Effectiveness and Efficiency: Ran-
dom Reflections on Health Services—the epidemiologist A. L. Cochrane identified
the use of ineffective treatments as one of the primary sources of inefficiency in
the health system. In response he argued that the treatments ought to be evalu-
ated scientifically, using the best available evidence. In particular, they ought to
be run as randomized controlled trials [RCTs] as a matter of course since these
trials eliminate bias and are the most systematic method available. We can trace
the evidence-based medicine movement back to this point.43 In both cases there
is an underlying ethical imperative to minimize harm, in this case by subjecting
treatments to better evaluation. In the context of evidence-based medicine there
is a notion of a ‘hierarchy of evidence’ which (qualitatively) ranks various forms
of evidential support for hypotheses by their level of susceptibility to bias and
confounding more generally.44 As John Worrall points out, RCTs are not always
deemed necessary; sometimes the efficacy of a treatment will be obvious, such as
when it prevents otherwise fatal conditions ([Worrall, 2000], p. S319).45
Cochrane, however, was concerned as much much the efficiency (i.e. the real
benefit of an an intervention outside the confines of the RCT) aspect as he was
with efficacy (i.e. the maximum possible effect) of treatments. In other words,
health economics was given equal weight. Efficiency and efficacy go hand in
hand: in getting rid of ineffective ‘treatments’, the burden on the system is re-
duced. Thus, health and economics go hand in hand. Cochrane’s early advo-
cacy of RCTs, an axiom of evidence-based medicine, was encapsulated in the
development of an international database of RCT evidence: The Cochrane Col-
laboration. Multiple RCTs on the same hypothesis are statistically analysed via
meta-analysis. This can strengthen or weaken the level of evidence. The evi-
dence is graded according to ‘quality’, and often, if there are multiple studies
of ‘higher quality’ any studies of ‘lower quality’ will be ignored (cf. [Doyle et
43The canonical definition of evidence-based medicine is: “the conscientious, explicit and judicious
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients” ([Sackett et
al., 1996], p. 71). Though well known in the context of clinical medicine, it has only recently been
expanded into public health, where “the patient” transforms into “the public”.
44See [Ashcroft, 2004] for a good review of several epistemological issues concerning evidence-
based medicine (and RCTs).
45Worrall (ibid., p. S328) also notes a curious inconsistency in the reasoning for the high status
of RCTs, namely their reliability. In meta-analyses of RCTs here is significant divergence over the
effectiveness of treatments.
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al., 2008], p. 214). This privileging of RCTs has been widely questioned, and
there is some lively debate in the philosophical literature: e.g. [Worrall, 2000;
2007] and [Grossman and Mackenzie, 2005]. Grossman and Mackenzie argue
that insufficient caution is used in assessing RCTs, as compared to the excessive
caution used when assessing observational studies. The case hasn’t been made,
they say, for the general superiority of RCTs over other study designs, and that
observational studies are sometimes better, as in the context of public health inter-
ventions, for example. Rather, the study design should be matched to the research
question, and this will sometimes mean that RCTs are most appropriate, but not
always. Worrall argues that the idea that RCTs control for all factors is a “will-
o’-the-wisp”: without supplementing an inference with background knowledge,
about plausible mechanisms and so on, there will be the potential for (plausible)
alternative causal factors underlying any evidence.
The notion of a controlled population-level experiment to intervene in all but
the simplest health-states is fraught with difficulties. For example, extremely large
samples are needed to detect even very small effects. Even when one can im-
plement such an experiment drawing causal inferences from them is incredibly
difficult. Suppose you want to alter the distribution of weight, so that there are
fewer anorexic and obese individuals, then one can see how to go about design-
ing an intervention to do this, and then measure the effect. Weight is a simple
additive factor so one can weigh a sample to see if there is a reduction following
the intervention (as compared to data gathered before the intervention). However,
one simply will not have the ability to control elements of the social and physical
environment to test whether the intervention worked—one major problem along
these lines is that one cannot ensure perfect compliance with the randomization.46
That is, even if there are significant differences in the weight distribution after the
intervention has been implemented one cannot be sure that it was the intervention
that was responsible. To assume otherwise is to commit the post hoc ergo propter
hoc fallacy: there is a strong possibility that some other factor was responsible.47
This is, of course, the problem of underdetermination of theory by data. Weed
[1997] discusses this problem in the context of a suggested relationship between
induced abortion and breast cancer. Another, classic, example is William Farr’s
study of the possible influence of marriage on mortality [1858]. The underdeter-
mination in this case concerned the issue of whether the observation that married
people tend to live longer than unmarried people was due to selection (the fact that
healthier people have a tendency to marry) or causation (married life leads to a
healthier life: “marriage protection”). Farr argued that it was a selection effect, and
recent statistical studies (involving longitudinal rather than cross-sectional tech-
46See [Kaufman et al., 2003] for a survey of the problems and prospects for conducting RCTs of
social interventions in the context of social epidemiology.
47A further factor that causes problems when conducting complex social interventions is that there
is often no standardization of intervention categories. [Doyle et al., 2008] give the example of differing
definitions of ‘smoker’ ‘ex-smoker’, ‘quitter’ and so on, that can lead to complications in comparing
results.
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niques) seem to confirm this: see, e.g., [Goldman, 1993]. Of course, this is not the
kind of thing one can experimentally determine!
Underdetermination can be broken by appealing to other factors external to the
data. Such factors may lead us to prefer one theory over another. However, Weed
notes that the ‘criteria’ used by epidemiologists to break the underdetermination
are rather weak. The standard method is to invoke Bradford Hill’s so-called causal-
criteria: specificity, strength of association, consistency, coherence, temporality,
dose-response, biological plausibility, experimentation, and analogy. These are
not intended to be necessary and sufficient conditions but rules of thumb. With
the exception of temporality (assuming the absence of retro-causality), all of the
criteria could be violated without ruling out causality—cf. [Weed, 1997], p. 113.48
Daniel Little suggests that the problem posed by confounding variables might
be resolved by invoking mechanisms and argues that the notion of a ‘plausible
mechanism’ could rule out some hypotheses:
We can best exclude the possibility of a spurious correlation between variables by forming a hypothesis
about the mechanisms at work in the circumstances. If we conclude that there is no plausible mecha-
nism linking nicotine stains to lung cancer, then we can also conclude that the observed correlation is
spurious. ([Little, 1991], pp. 24–25)
This approach appears to be more or less in line with Bradford Hill’s methodol-
ogy. I think Steel [2004] offers a definitive dismissal of the ‘plausible mechanism’
method of breaking this inferential deadlock, at least concerning ‘negative’ ex-
planations (i.e. those showing that we can infer that X is not a cause of Y when
there is no plausible mechanism connecting them). He argues that it is in reality
extremely difficult to think up any case of a social phenomenon that could not
be explained via some plausible mechanism (ibid., p. 65). Moreover, it seems
rather odd to think that the inability to imagine a mechanism generating some phe-
nomenon in some ways aids causal inference (ibid., p. 66). We might also point to
the looseness in the notion of ‘plausibility’ here.
9
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY
The internal validity of a trial concerns the extent to which differences between the
trial arms can be attributed to the intervention. As Guala puts it, internal validity
48Note that Bradford Hill wished explicitly to avoid philosophical issues, and furthermore made no
claim that he was presenting criteria for causation. He states that he is presenting aspects of associa-
tions that would lead us to conclude that causation “is the most likely interpretation” ([Bradford Hill,
1965], p. 295). This does not imply that meeting all of the aspects is definite evidence of causality at
play. Bradford Hill was concerned with grounds for public health action over perfect knowledge: “All
scientific work is incomplete—whether it be observational or experimental. All scientific work is liable
to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us a freedom to ignore
the knowledge we already have, or to postpone the action that it appears to demand at a given time”
(ibid., p. 300). It is interesting to speculate on what the health-research landscape might look like had
researchers followed this message rather than Cochrane’s.
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“is achieved when the structure and behaviour of a laboratory system (its main
causal factors, the ways they interact, and the phenomena they bring about) have
been properly understood by the experimenter” ([2003], p. 1198). It is a causal
principle: low internal validity means that we can’t tell whether some other factors
infected the trial and caused the differences. Such methodology makes these trials
practically difficult, for one needs a large number of entire groups. Naturally,
the group, being composed of individuals, depends on these individuals so that
blinding is done at the lower level, and expected to transfer to the group level.
However, the blinding procedure is especially problematic in cluster trials.
The fundamental idea of trials is to generate evidence on which to base or with-
hold some intervention. In some cases the intervention will be applied at one site
only. However, more often the intervention will be applied to multiple subjects,
be they individual patients or hospital wards or entire cities. That is, the results of
the trial are generalized away from the original test site, despite a host of differ-
ences between them. External validity refers to the generality of the results: trials
with high external validity are most likely to have their results replicated in diverse
contexts.49
Guala labels ‘radical localism’ the view that “Experimental results do not ap-
ply to the world out of the laboratory” ([Guala, 2003], p. 1196; see also [Guala,
1999])—there is a close resemblance between this view and Nancy Cartwright’s
idea of a ’dappled world’ according to which we do not have grounds for believing
that laws of nature transfer from “the highly contrived environments of a labora-
tory [to] less regulated settings” ([Cartwright, 1999], p. 25). This notion seems
particularly appropriate in the context of group-level or population-level health in-
tervention research, of the kind appearing in public health. In such cases the con-
text (the social and physical environment) can interfere with the experiment—so-
called “neighbourhood effects” (i.e. the effects of social context, such as a residen-
tial community, on health outcomes) constitute one instance of this phenomena.50
One way of attempting to correct for neighbourhood effects is to employ multi-
level modeling and multilevel analysis, involving the treatment of neighbourhoods
as contexts with individuals nested within, in order to separate out the effects (see
[Diez-Roux, 2000], especially pp. 180–183). However, there are many problems
of validity and causal inference that remain to be worked out in this context in or-
der to have applicability in public health: see [Oakes, 2004] for a review of these
issues.
10
49Meta-analysis is intended to provide a quantitative estimate of the degree of replication or consis-
tency across several trials that aim to test the same hypothesis. More importantly, perhaps, it allows
for the investigation of trials that yield inconsistent results. Weed [2000] argues that meta-analysis can
offer a better estimate of an effect than the usual ‘criteria based’ rule of thumb employed.
50This idea can, perhaps, trace its ancestry back to Durkheim and Weber’s studies of the ways in
which social forces and factors can influence various behaviours.
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CONCLUSION
I hope to have shown in this brief guide that the philosophy of public health has
many untilled fields ripe for cultivating. The mixture of concepts and techniques
(from statistics, epidemiology, demography, and so on) used in public health result
in novel philosophical issues not to be found in the study of clinical medicine (or, at
least, not in the same form). For this reason it ought to be studied by philosophers
alongside clinical medicine, with equal vigour.
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